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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine and evaluate further the psychometric 
properties of a self-report inventory of cognitive distortions using a nonclinical, 
community sample.  A group of 474 individuals were contacted via the social networking 
site, Facebook, and through a college list-serve and were asked to complete multiple 
measures and also to send the link to other individuals, thus utilizing a snowball sample.  
The measures used included the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD), Dysfunctional 
Attitude Scale (DAS), Perceived Stress Scale (PSS), and a brief questionnaire to collect 
demographic information on each participant.  Results revealed positive psychometric 
properties for the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions and were generally consistent with 
findings from the initial study, which utilized a clinical sample in order to examine the 
factor structure.  Internal consistency reliability analysis of the total scale was found to be 
strong with a Coefficient Alpha of .97, which is consistent with the previous study (alpha 
= .98).  Factor analysis revealed 12 factors, eight of which closely resemble factors from 
the original study.  The eight common factors included, Magnification, Fortune-Telling, 
Externalization of Self-Worth, Perfectionism, Emotional Reasoning, Minimization, 
Comparison to Others and Emotional Reasoning and Decision Making.  Four new factors 
were identified, including Discounting the Positive and Personalization, Absolutistic or 
Dichotomous Thinking, Should Statements, and Catastrophizing.  The ICD correlated 
significantly with both the DAS (p < .001) and PSS (p < .001) measures.  The current 
study also examined differences in overall levels of cognitive distortions as measured by 
the ICD across three demographic variables, gender, age, and level of education.  
Females were found to endorse significantly higher levels of cognitive distortions than 
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males (p = .006); however, the effect size was relatively small (d = -0.30).  Participants 
who were within 18-29 years of age indicated significantly higher levels of cognitive 
distortions than individuals 41-85 years of age (p < .001, η2 = 0.35 – large effect size), 
and there was generally a gradual decrease in cognitive distortions across the age ranges.  
Level of cognitive distortions was not influenced by level of education (p = .68).  Last, 
participants’ levels of cognitive distortions were able to predict, significantly, levels of 
perceived stress (p < .001). Future research should include continued testing of the ICD 
with a larger clinical population, include the ability to assess changes in cognitive 
distortions over time during treatment, and examine the overall utility of the ICD to the 
practicing clinician. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements          iv 
Abstract           vi 
Table of Contents          viii 
List of Tables           xi 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION          1 
 
 Statement of the Problem        1 
 Purpose of the Study         5 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW         5 
 
 Cognitive Theory         5 
 Schema Theory         7 
 Combining Theories         8 
Diathesis-Stress Model        10    
 Information Processing and Cognition      11 
 Cognitive Distortions Defined       14 
 Definitions and Types of Cognitive Distortions     15 
 Evolutionary Theory of Cognitive Distortions     16 
 Cognitive Distortions and Mental Illness      20 
  Depression         20 
  Anxiety         23 
  Other Axis I and Axis II Disorders      25 
 Measures of Cognitive Distortion       26 
  Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire      26 
  Cognitive Errors Questionnaire      28  
  Cognitive Distortions Scale       31 
  Dysfunctional Attitude Scale       33 
 Limitations of Prior Cognitive Distortion Measures     36 
 Inventory of Cognitive Distortions       37 
 Cognitive Distortions and Stress       41 
 Perceived Stress Scale        43  
  Development and Background      43 
  Evidence Supporting Use of Perceived Stress Scale    44 
 Cognitive Distortions and Demographic Characteristics    47 
 Internet Data Collection        50 
 Collecting Data from Facebook       52 
 Benefits and Limitations of Snowball Sampling     54 
 Summary          56 
 Definition of Terms         57 
 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  ix 
CHAPTER 2 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS         60 
  
Hypotheses          60 
  Hypothesis One        60 
  Hypothesis Two        61 
  Hypothesis Three        62 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY          63 
 
 Recruitment of Participants        63 
 Inclusion Criteria         64 
 Exclusion Criteria         64 
 Design          64 
 Materials          65 
 Procedure          65 
 Measures          66 
  Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD)     66 
  Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS)     67 
  Perceived Stress Scale (PSS)       68 
   
CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS           70 
 
 Participants          70  
 Hypothesis One         72 
  Factory Analysis of ICD       72 
  Correlation of ICD Factors       77 
  ICD Coefficient Alpha Reliability      78 
  ICD Content Validity Analyses      78 
 Hypothesis Two         79 
Difference in Cognitive Distortions Across Demographics as  
Measured by the ICD        79 
   Gender        79 
   Age         80 
   Level of Education       81 
 Hypothesis Three         81 
  ICD Predicting Scores on PSS      81 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION          83 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  x 
 
 Psychometric Properties        84 
 Demographic Characteristics        90 
 Stress and Cognitive Distortion       93 
 Implications of Findings        94 
 Limitations          96 
 Future Studies         97 
 
REFERENCES         114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  xi 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. ICD Factor Loadings        99 
Table 2. Explanation of Variance by Factor       104 
Table 3. Pearson Inter-Correlation Matrix of ICD Factors     105 
Table 4. Coefficient Alpha Reliability for Individual ICD Factors    106 
Table 5. Correlations Between ICD, DAS, and PSS      107 
Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations for ICD Scores  
based on Gender (N = 474)        108 
Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations for ICD Scores based  
on Age (N = 474)         109  
Table 8. Means and Standard Deviations for ICD Scores based on Level  
of Education (N = 474)        110 
Table 9. Summary of Regression Analysis for Participant's ICD Total  
Score Predicting PSS Total Score (N = 474)      111 
Figure 1. Relationship Between ICD and DAS      112 
Figure 2. Relationship Between ICD and PSS      113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Running head: COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS   
INVENTORY OF COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS: VALIDATION OF A MEASURE OF 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS USING A COMMUNITY SAMPLE 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 Statement of the Problem. 
A steady increase in the prevalence of mental health diagnoses in the United 
States has been observed in recent years.  In 1999, it was estimated that 22% of 
Americans, ages 18 and older suffered from a mental disorder (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 1999).  In comparison, in 2005, it was estimated that within 
a given year approximately one quarter, or 26.2%, of adults were diagnosed with a 
mental illness (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005).  Of all mental disorders, anxiety 
disorders continue to have the highest prevalence rate among Americans, estimated to 
have affected 16.4% in 1999 and 18.1% in 2005 (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1999; Kessler et al., 2005).  Mood disorders had the second highest prevalence 
rate in 1999 and in 2005, with estimates of 7.1% and 9.5% of the population having been 
affected, respectively (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999; Kessler et 
al., 2005).  Those suffering from anxiety and mood disorders as well as other mental 
illnesses tend to have higher health care expenditures than those who do not have 
symptoms (National Institute of Mental Health, 2006).  In 2006, of those individuals with 
a diagnosis of a mental disorder, 36.2 million paid for mental health services, creating a 
health care expenditure totaling $57.5 billion (National Institute of Mental Health, 2006).  
Because of the increase in the prevalence of mental disorders and high health care costs 
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due to mental illness, more effective methods of assessing, diagnosing, and treating 
individuals with mental health problems are necessary. 
   To reduce the prevalence of mental illness and its subsequent impact on health 
care expenditure, the focus of measurement and treatment should include specific factors 
contributing to symptomatology, such as distorted thinking and dysfunctional schema 
(Beck, Steer, Brown, & Weissman, 1991).  Cognitive theory implies that cognitive 
distortion is a common factor across emotional disorders (Beck, 1967); these distortions 
represent ways in which an individual modifies and interprets his or her everyday 
experiences.  When the distortions are negative, the individual begins to interpret his or 
her experiences through dysfunctional subjective constructs (Beck, 1967; 1976).  
Cognitive distortions involve processing information in a dysfunctional manner; Beck 
(1967; 1976) believed that these distortions were possible antecedents to emotional 
disorders.  Cognitive distortions have been found to maintain mood and anxiety 
disorders, the two most common mental disorders in the U.S. (Burns & Eidelson, 1998; 
Kessler et al., 2005).  Individuals who cope with depression have interpretational 
frameworks that are absolutist, revolving around themes of loss, deprivation, and 
personal inadequacy (Burns & Eidelson, 1998).  Those who cope with anxiety have 
distortions that are probabilistic in nature and consist of perceptions of possible future 
psychological or physical harm (Burns & Eidelson, 1998). 
 Beck’s (1967; 1970) cognitive model of psychopathology emphasizes the 
measurement of pertinent constructs such as labeling an individual’s specific cognitive 
errors.  The model also suggests the importance of understanding the interaction between 
cognitive distortions and other mediators that increase the risk of clinical 
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symptomatology.  Researchers have found a significant relationship between perceived 
stress and depressive symptomatology in a clinical sample (Hewitt, Flett, & Mosher, 
1992).  Research has also identified cognitive distortions as mediators between life stress 
and depression in an adolescent sample (Deal & Williams, 1988).  The literature suggests 
that cognitive distortions affect the perceived stressfulness of life events and play a role 
in the maintenance of emotional disorders (Hammen, 1978; Deal & Williams, 1988).  
Although stress and cognitive distortions have been found to correlate significantly with 
the occurrence of psychopathology, research suggests that measures of cognitive 
distortions may be better predictors of emotional disorders than measures of life stress 
(Deal & Williams, 1988).  The research suggests the importance of effectively labeling 
and attending to cognitive distortion when treating emotional disorders (Deal & 
Williams, 1988).  
 The Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD) is a measure designed to identify 
specifically, both the distinctive and categorical use of cognitive distortions by mental 
health patients (Yurica, 2002; DiTomasso & Yurica, 2011).  As cognitive theory implies, 
cognitive distortions are important in the etiology and progression of emotional disorders 
(Beck, 1976; Beck & Beck, 2011; Burns, 1980).  If these distortions can be identified and 
labeled through the use of a brief quantitative measure, it would enable the clinician to 
assess for distortions more efficiently and track changes in distorted thinking.  According 
to Beck’s (1967; 1970) cognitive model, learned ways of thinking about internal and 
external stimuli, based on negative core beliefs or schema, create cognitive distortions, 
which in turn maintain emotional disorders.  If clinicians can identify and change these 
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cognitive distortions, the core belief may be impacted, causing a reduction in 
symptomatology.       
The ICD, which has been examined using several different clinical populations, 
was effective in identifying cognitive distortions.  Within a clinical sample, the ICD has 
been found to correlate significantly both with a standard depression inventory and with a 
standard anxiety inventory (Yurica, 2002) and is able to identify the severity of 
psychological dysfunction in patients suffering from Axis I or Axis II disorders 
(Rosenfield, 2004); it is also able to identify relationships between distorted thinking and 
psychological and behavioral health risks (Uhl, 2007).  Although the ICD demonstrates 
empirical support of its use in a clinical sample, its psychometric properties have not 
been examined using a large, community sample.  In order to better examine the strength 
of the factor structure and the validity of psychological measures, it has been suggested 
that the psychometric properties of the ICD be examined using a nonclinical sample, 
similar to previous studies (Wiessman & Beck, 1978; Cohen, Kamarack, & Mermelstein, 
1983).  Also, using a large, community sample provides the opportunity for examination 
of the prevalence of cognitive distortion across different demographic characteristics, 
such as age, gender, and level of education. 
To further establish the ICD as a useful clinical measure, its properties should be 
investigated in a manner similar to the investigation of other established measures of 
cognitive distortion.  The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), a leading measure for 
dysfunctional beliefs in clinical practice, was validated initially using a nonclinical 
sample consisting of college students and teachers in order to demonstrate the strength 
and sensitivity of the measure (Weissman & Beck, 1978).  The ICD should be analyzed 
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using similar methodology to ensure the strength of the factor structure as well as to 
demonstrate further its utility as compared with the DAS.  Also, focusing on a 
community sample will provide a broader range of participants, therefore increasing the 
generalizability of the measure.   
 Purpose of the Study. 
 The purpose of this study was to examine and further evaluate the psychometric 
properties of the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD), which has been shown to 
measure 11 types of cognitive distortions as defined by previous research for use with an 
adult clinical population (Beck 1976, 1967; Burns, 1980, 1989; Freeman & Oster, 1999; 
Gilson & Freeman, 1999; Yurica, 2002; Rosenfield, 2004).  The overall intention of this 
study was threefold: 1) to further validate the psychometric properties and factor structure 
of the ICD using a community sample; 2) to investigate how cognitive distortions in a 
community sample vary as a function of certain demographic characteristics such as 
gender, age, and level of education, and 3) to investigate whether or not level of distorted 
thinking can predict level of perceived stress, both of which can be antecedents to 
emotional disorders (Hammen, 1978; Deal & Williams, 1998). 
Literature Review 
 Cognitive Theory. 
 Beck’s cognitive theory is an important and influential theory relating to the 
progression and treatment of emotional disorders (Beck, 1967; 1976; Bruno, 2010).  
Beck’s original approach to the treatment of mental illness was based on a Freudian 
perspective, whose theory of “melancholia” involved anger being directed inward.  
Following his study of depressed patients, Beck believed Freud’s theory was flawed and 
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he theorized that negative biases and distortions tended to be a common factor to the 
cognitive processes of depressed patients (Beck & Weishaar, 1989).  Based on his 
observations, Beck identified the cognitive triad of emotional disorders.  He suggested 
that a commonality among depressed patients regarded a negative view of the self, the 
world or environment, and the future (Beck, 1967; 1976; Beck & Beck, 2011).  He 
believed this triad applied to all emotional disorders; these disorders are psychological 
states that involve a maladaptive excess of negative emotions or a deficiency in positive 
emotional production and control (Clark & Beck, 2010).  This term, emotional disorder, 
is used to encompass states of anxiety or depression.  Beck’s cognitive model posits that 
dysfunctional thinking relating to the cognitive triad is common to all psychological 
disturbances (Beck & Beck, 2011).  Along with Beck (1967), Ellis (1977) agreed that 
cognitions play an integral part in influencing emotions and behaviors.   
Ellis (1962; 1977) developed Rational Emotive Therapy (RET), which identified 
11 irrational beliefs thought to predispose an individual to negative emotional reactions 
or the development of an emotional disorder.  Ellis’ RET was a cognitive approach to 
therapy, similar to that of Beck’s (1967; 1976); it is based on the concept that irrational 
beliefs were the source of emotional distress or the cause of dysfunctional behavior.  
Ellis’ (1989) model suggests that when a strong emotional consequence follows a 
significant activating event, the individual believes the event causes the negative 
emotional reaction, but, in fact, the emotional reaction is caused by the individual’s belief 
system.  For example, a large number of people experienced the 9/11 tragedy, but each 
person had a different reaction to the situation based on his or her belief system.  The 
goal of RET is to alter the negative belief system, which in turn will help to change how 
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people react to external stimuli.  Beck’s (1967; 1976) cognitive therapy is slightly 
different because it attempts to alter the dysfunctional processing, which can change the 
maladaptive belief system.  By understanding how these negative cognitions or belief 
systems are generated and by developing therapeutic techniques to alter them, cognitive 
therapy and RET became established treatments for the alleviation of emotional 
disorders. 
 Cognitive therapy’s conceptual framework relies on the belief that an individual’s 
subjective assessment of early life experiences shapes and maintains fundamental beliefs 
about the self, world, and future (Beck, 1967; 1976).  These fundamental beliefs are 
called schemas, which are defined as systems of organizing and perceiving new 
information (Young, 1994).  Beck (1967) believed that the presence of negative schema 
is what makes individuals vulnerable to psychiatric symptoms because they interpret their 
environments through a dysfunctional framework.  The idea of schema being the 
foundation for the development and maintenance of emotional disorders was later 
incorporated into Young’s schema theory of depression or negative affect (Young, 1994). 
 Schema Theory. 
 Schema theory relates negative childhood experiences, temperament, and early 
maladaptive schema to the experience of depression and other emotional disorders 
(Young, Klosko, Weisharr, 2003).  Schema theory suggests that early maladaptive 
schema causes individuals to be vulnerable to emotional disorders because these 
individuals organize their experiences based on a negative interpretational framework.  
Young and colleagues (2003) define early maladaptive schemas as “broad, pervasive 
themes or patterns, comprised of memories, emotions, cognitions, and bodily sensations, 
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regarding oneself and one’s relationships with others, developed during childhood or 
adolescence, elaborated throughout one’s lifetime and dysfunctional to a significant 
degree” (p. 7).  Young and colleagues suggest that the origin of early maladaptive schema 
develops from the obstruction of core emotional needs by negative experiences.  The 
researchers proposed five core emotional needs, which if negatively experienced, could 
lead to dysfunctional schema (Young et al., 2003; Jesinoski, 2010).  The core emotional 
needs include: 
1. Secure attachments to others (e.g. safety, nurturance, acceptance); 
2. Autonomy and sense of identity; 
3. Freedom to express needs and emotions; 
4. Spontaneity and play; and 
5. Realistic limits and self-control. 
Young and colleagues speculate that the combination of nature (innate temperament) and 
nurture (early life experiences) can result in either the gratification or the obstruction of 
these needs.  Early maladaptive schema, which impact secondary beliefs that influence 
assumptions of the self and world, result from the obstruction of these core emotional 
needs by negative experiences (Jesinoski, 2010). 
 Combining Theories. 
 According to Beck’s cognitive model, schemas serve to organize prior 
experiences, guide the interpretation of new experiences, and shape expectancies of the 
future (Beck, 1967; Beck, Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991).  Similar to Young and 
colleagues (2003), Beck believed negative schema to be stable, enduring cognitive 
structures that affect the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information (Beck, 1967, 
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1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Beck’s theory explains early maladaptive 
schemas as vulnerability factors for depression and other emotional disorders (Whisman 
& Kwon, 1992).  Beck’s model describes how a child learns to assemble reality through 
his or her early experiences with the environment.  Sometimes these early experiences 
cause the child to accept beliefs that may prove maladaptive during adulthood (Beck & 
Young, 1985).  During adolescence and adulthood, when in the presence of relevant 
environmental triggers, the early maladaptive schemas become activated and salient, 
which often contributes to the development of psychiatric disorders (Beck, 1967). 
 This is not to say that cognitive distortions and early maladaptive schemas are the 
only predisposing factors for the development of emotional disorders.  Dysfunctional 
thoughts, beliefs, assumptions and cognitive processing are only pieces to the overall 
puzzle concerning the etiology of emotional disorders.  Other contributing or 
predisposing factors include, but are not limited to, genetic heritability, physical disease 
states, psychological trauma, and absence of coping mechanisms (DiTomasso, Freeman, 
Carvajal, & Zahn, 2009).  There are certainly other models that explain the development 
of mood disorders, but the ICD was developed based on Beck’s cognitive theory.  The 
cognitive model places primary emphasis on cognitive factors in predisposing individuals 
to emotional disorders (DiTomasso et al., 2009).  For example, individuals suffering from 
anxiety disorders tend to have underlying unrealistic beliefs concerning threat or danger 
and these beliefs are activated in the presence of situations with similar conditions to 
those events during which the anxiety schemas were learned.  “When these schemas are 
activated, they fuel the patient’s thinking, behavior, and emotion, all of which can serve 
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to reciprocally reinforce one another and the underlying schema” (DiTomasso et al., 
2009, p. 107).      
Based on pre-established, underlying schemas, secondary beliefs develop and 
function as rules or assumptions regarding the perception of the cognitive triad (Beck et 
al., 1979).  These secondary beliefs, rules, or assumptions define self-worth and can 
develop into further learned ways of thinking (Beck et al., 1979).  The function of the 
learned ways of thinking is to support the core negative schemata, causing habitual 
generalizing and distorting of internal and external stimuli.  Cognitive distortions develop 
through this chain of core maladaptive schema influencing secondary beliefs and 
assumptions.  For example, if a maladaptive schema is activated by an individual’s 
environment, access to negative thoughts, beliefs, or assumptions occurs.  These then 
trigger a pattern of continuous negative self-information characterized by cognitive errors 
or distortions.  According to Beck, the danger of engaging in this pattern of cognitions is 
the possible development of the negative cognitive triad – viewing the self, world and 
future in a negative manner (Beck, 1967; Abela, & D’Alessandro, 2002).  Beck’s theory 
suggests that maladaptive information processing of internal and external stimuli by 
negative schema and cognitive distortions causes individuals to become more susceptible 
to emotional disorders.  The goal of Beck’s cognitive therapy is to change negative 
cognitive distortions, in hopes of altering the maladaptive core belief or schema, in order 
to alleviate symptoms of emotional disorders. 
 Diathesis-Stress Model. 
 Beck’s cognitive theory is also based on a diathesis-stress model.  This model 
suggests that the combination of maladaptive schema or negative predisposition 
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(diathesis) and the perception of negative life events (stress) cause symptoms of an 
emotional disorder (Bruno, 2010).  When an individual who has a maladaptive 
predisposition causing him or her to process information with a negative framework has 
the experience of a stressful event, he or she becomes more susceptible to mental illness 
(Sigelman & Rider, 2009; Abela, & D’Alessandro, 2002).  Beck (1967) hypothesized that 
the maladaptive schema are typically dormant in individuals vulnerable to emotional 
disorders and the schema will exert an influence on information processing when 
activated by relevant stressors.  It is the combination of maladaptive information 
processing and perceived stress that can lead to emotional disorders. 
When individuals are experiencing stress, underlying maladaptive schema can 
cause an interpretation of the event through a distorted thinking filter.  Once the negative 
cognitive distortion is activated, the maladaptive appraisal of the stressful event can 
worsen.  Individuals with high levels of cognitive distortion may perceive stressful events 
as being more stressful than individuals with low levels of cognitive distortion because 
they are processing the situations in ways that distort the potential impact of the events.  
The diathesis-stress component of Beck’s cognitive model lends further evidence to the 
information processing approach to emotional disorders. 
 Information Processing and Cognition. 
 Beck’s cognitive theory is based on the premise that negative schema influences 
how individuals perceive and interpret their environments (Ingram, 1984).  The theory 
suggests that individuals suffering from an emotional disorder process incoming 
information in a dysfunctional manner.  Kendall (1992) suggests that this dysfunction can 
take place in different areas of the cognitive taxonomy.  Kendall has described an 
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information processing system consisting of four features, which include: (1) cognitive 
content; (2) cognitive process; (3) cognitive products and (4) cognitive structures.  
Cognitive content is defined as the information stored and organized in memory.  
Cognitive processes are the mechanisms by which an information processing system 
processes information over time.  This includes attentional, encoding, and retrieval 
processes.  Cognitive structures refer to how information or cognitive content is stored.  
Kendall suggests that cognitive content is stored in terms of how it relates to other 
information.  Cognitive structures are templates that filter certain cognitive processes.  
Last, cognitive products are the end results of the operations of the information 
processing system.  These are the thoughts or cognitions that are produced as a result of 
the interaction between content (self-referent speech), process (processing mechanisms), 
and structure (mental filters).   
Cognitive distortions take place in the domain of cognitive processes, but are 
identified as cognitive products or what the person is thinking.  An individual’s causal 
explanation for some situation is the product of cognitive processes and related content 
(Kendall, 1992).  Kendall suggests, “The manner with which the person processes the 
information will have an influence on their emotional and behavioral responses and their 
overall level of adjustment” (p.2).  If an individual is processing external and internal 
information based on a negative filter or schema, this can affect his or her ability to cope 
with stressful situations, possibly leading to an emotional disorder. 
 Within the cognitive process feature of the information processing system, 
Kendall (1992) differentiates between processing deficiencies and processing distortions.  
Processing deficiencies occurs when an individual has inadequate cognitive activity in 
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situations in which information processing would prove beneficial.  An example is a 
situation in which an individual acts without actively processing external information or 
acts without thinking and the behavior results in unintended consequences.  Processing 
distortions occur when an individual is actively processing information, but the thinking 
processes are misguided (Kendall, 1992).  For example, an individual may engage in 
processing but does so by filtering information through faulty reasoning processes, 
resulting in unwanted consequences.  In the instance of emotional disorders, the faulty 
reasoning processes can stem from negative core beliefs or schema (Beck, 1967; 1976).  
The distinction between processing deficiencies and processing distortions is that one 
entails a failure to think and the other is a pattern of thinking in a distorted manner 
(Kendall, 1992). 
 Although processing distortions has been presented as dysfunctional, research 
suggests that some processing distortions can be functional or serve a purpose for 
maintaining positive mental health.  Kendall (1992) suggests that more accurate 
perceptions of the surrounding environment, or more realistic cognitions, do not 
necessarily lead to a healthy mental state or to successful behavioral adjustment.  For 
example, depressed patients have been found to engage in more negative cognition than 
non-depressed patients; however, depressed patients tended to be more accurate or 
realistic in their thinking than non-depressed patients (Alloy & Abramson, 1988).  
Research proposes that extremely positive cognitive distortions can be functional and 
benefit the individual (Kendall, 1992: Taylor & Brown, 1988).  Taylor and Brown (1988) 
coined the term positive illusions to describe three functional distortions of cognitive 
processing.  The three distortions include (1) inflated assessment of one’s own abilities, 
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(2) unrealistic optimism about the future, and (3) an exaggerated sense of control (Taylor 
& Brown 1988).  These positive illusions or functional distortions are believed to be 
adaptive strategies for coping with stressful situations and for promoting positive mental 
health.  Although some processing distortions can be functional, research tends to focus 
on dysfunctional distortions because they are believed to produce and maintain emotional 
disorders (Beck, 1967; 1976; Ellis, 1977; Beck & Beck, 2011).   
 Cognitive Distortions Defined. 
 Emotional disorders develop due to a lack of functional distortions and the 
presence of dysfunctional distortions (Burns, 1980; 1989; 1999).  The negative emotional 
state is generated by biased information processing due to the subjective experience of 
negative automatic thoughts based on maladaptive schema (Clark & Beck, 2010).  
Negative automatic thoughts are defined as “thoughts that come rapidly, automatically, 
and involuntarily to mind when a person is stressed or upset and seem plausible at the 
time” (Neenan & Dryden, 2006, p. 5).  According to the cognitive model, the world 
presents individuals with negative, positive, or neutral events, which they then interpret 
with a series of automatic thoughts causing certain feelings or moods.  The feelings are 
created by the individual’s thoughts and not by the actual events (Burns, 1980).  If the 
individual interprets the events using negative automatic thoughts, maladaptive feelings 
develop.  These negative automatic thoughts are based on cognitive distortions derived 
from negative core beliefs or schema.  Beck (1967) defined cognitive distortions as 
processing information in a predictable manner, resulting in identifiable errors in 
thinking.  Cognitive distortions negatively skew the way in which individuals perceive 
the cognitive triad.   
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In general, cognitive distortions represent the different means by which 
individuals modify their experiences, thereby creating dysfunctional subjective constructs 
(Yurica, 2002).  Beck, Freeman, Davis, and associates (2006) describe cognitive 
distortions in the following way, “A patient’s cognitive distortions serve as sign posts that 
point to schema.  The style of distorting the content, frequency and consequences of the 
distortions are all important elements” (p. 28). The ultimate goal of cognitive therapy and 
cognitive behavioral therapy is to identify and change the habitual and dysfunctional 
ways in which a patient perceives his or her experience, in order to change his or her 
maladaptive schema. 
 Definitions and Types of Cognitive Distortions. 
 Originally, Beck (1967) defined six cognitive errors in thinking or faulty 
information processing.  The six cognitive errors identified were: (1) arbitrary inference; 
(2) absolutistic or dichotomous thinking; (3) magnification and minimization; (4) 
overgeneralization; (5) personalization; and (6) selective abstraction (see Definition of 
Terms). 
 Several years after Beck (1967) defined his original cognitive errors, Burns 
(1980) expanded the list to include a total of 10 types of cognitive distortions.  The 10 
distortions included: (1) all-or-nothing thinking; (2) discounting the positive; (3) 
emotional reasoning; (4) jumping to conclusions; (5) labeling; (6) magnification or 
minimization; (7) mental filter; (8) overgeneralization; (9) personalization; and (10) 
should statements (see Definition of Terms).  
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  16 
 Freeman and DeWolf (1992) and Freeman and Oster (1992) developed three 
additional cognitive distortions including: (1) comparison; (2) externalization of self- 
worth; and (3) perfectionism (see Definition of Terms).  
   The previously defined cognitive distortions represent the major categories of 
distorted thinking discussed in the clinical literature.  This list does not represent all 
possible types of cognitive distortions and as research advances, it is possible that 
additional distortions may be identified (Yurica, 2002). 
 Evolutionary Theory of Cognitive Distortions. 
 Based on the information-processing model of cognitive distortions, researchers 
have a good understanding of how distortions develop, but an important question to 
address is why dysfunctional thoughts develop.  Gilbert (1998) takes an approach in 
evolutionary psychology to explain the purpose of cognitive distortions and the reasons 
why they develop from faulty information processing.  Gilbert suggested that cognitive 
distortions are not simply maladaptive thought patterns, but rather that they are adaptive 
reactions in response to the perception of threat.  Gilbert believed human beings have 
evolved to think adaptively in order to survive.  
 Gilbert (1998) suggests that there are two mental systems that process 
information.  The first system is a fast track system that quickly appraises a situation for 
threat and evokes an immediate response.  This system utilizes heuristics, or mental 
shortcuts, to evaluate sensory information and triggers a fight or flight response in 
reaction to a perceived threat.  The second system is a rational system that analyzes 
situations, using information from memory and complex deductive logic to reach a 
conclusion.  This tends to be a slow, conscious process (Gilbert, 1998).  Gilbert suggests 
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that cognitive distortions arise from the first system, as adaptive protective responses in 
the form of defensive processing.   
  For example, people are constantly immersed in information from the 
environment, so much so that it becomes difficult to decipher the relevant information 
from the irrelevant.  Humans do not have enough time to attend to, analyze and interpret 
all external stimuli, so they are forced to use mental shortcuts to better navigate their 
surroundings.  Some mental shortcuts used to interpret information may have derived 
from dysfunctional cognitive processing, but this was evolutionarily more efficient in 
aiding human survival (Gilbert, 1998).  For example, natural selection might favor a 
distant human ancestor whose mental heuristic of perceived threat in reaction to the 
rustling of a bush triggered a flight response to avoid a dangerous animal.  Natural 
selection may not favor the individual who uses careful analysis during such a situation 
(Shermer, 2006).  In this case, the distorted mental shortcut of perceived threat each time 
a bush rustles might be adaptive.  Gilbert (1998) explains the adaptive functionality of 
seven cognitive distortions found in the clinical literature from an evolutionary 
perspective; each will be discussed: 
1. Selective Abstraction.  Gilbert (1998) proposed that this distortion derives from 
an attentional bias, which can occur without conscious awareness and focuses on 
negative information.  The function of this type of thinking would be to attend to 
and detect a threat quickly and efficiently in order to avoid a negative situation. 
2. Arbitrary Inference (Jumping to Conclusions).  During emergency situations an 
individual needs to think categorically in order to determine whether or not the 
event presents a threat.  Logical thinking is a slower form of processing in 
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comparison with categorical thinking, which allows for quick adaptive decision-
making.  When forced to make a quick decision, reducing the number of choices 
can increase the speed with which the decision is made.  For example, in the 
situation with the rustling bush, the categories would be threat or no threat 
(Shermer, 2006).  According to Gilbert (1997; 1998) arbitrary inference is the 
most salient cognitive distortion because one would prefer to be safe by reacting 
quickly rather than experience the possible consequences of not reacting at all. 
3. Dichotomous Thinking (All-or-Nothing).  Again, this cognitive distortion 
involves categorical thinking in order to make a quick judgment of threat or no 
threat.  Swift decision making through categorical processing can reduce 
response time, which may lead to an action that will help avoid the potential 
threat (Gilbert, 1998). 
4. Emotional Reasoning.  By relying on fast track emotional reasoning to make 
decisions, individuals can use their emotions to interpret the level of perceived 
threat during events, increasing the probability of reacting in a safe manner. 
5.  Disqualifying the Positives.  Minimizing one’s own attributes or being restrained 
in the estimation of one’s abilities is generally related to modesty.  Research has 
found that low levels of modesty can be perceived as an attractive trait 
(Baumeister, 1992).  If one is viewed as attractive, he or she will be more likely 
to mate and pass on the modesty trait.  Also, by minimizing one’s own abilities, 
he or she may be protected from unrealistic expectations by others (Gilbert 1997; 
1998). 
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6. Comparison.  Gilbert (1998) discusses the comparison distortion (Freeman & 
DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1992) in terms of a social comparison of the 
self or others, either in the positive or negative direction.  It is adaptive for people 
to compare themselves socially in order to know how to fit in with the dominant 
group, to understand how to advance socially, to recognize who in society is 
superior or inferior, and to determine the most beneficial method of interacting 
with others (Gilbert, 1998).  Depending on how an individual compares him or 
herself with others can have an impact on self-esteem, level of confidence, and 
feelings of stress or of happiness.  For example, if comparing oneself to others 
and the view of self is positive and the view of others is negative, an increase in 
self-esteem may occur.  But, if the view of self is negative and the view of others 
is positive, a reduction in self-esteem may take place. 
7. Personalization (Self-Blame).  Attributions of self-blame may be adaptive because 
it offers an illusion of control over random threatening events.  The illusion of 
control allows for the misperception of control over purely chance-determined 
negative events, often comforting the individual that he or she could have 
controlled the situation.  This feeling of control can lead to the belief that a 
negative event can be prevented in the future (Langer, 1975).  Self-blame may 
also lead to the avoidance of attacks on others, which in turn reduces the risk of 
attacks by others (Gilbert, 1998). 
Gilbert (1998) hypothesized that cognitive distortions are mediated by an 
unconscious information processing system that quickly interprets environmental events, 
using mental shortcuts to aid in human survival through the avoidance of threats.  
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Although these automatic cognitive mechanisms were once adaptive and necessary for 
survival, present day cognitive distortions can be maladaptive and lead to mental illness. 
Cognitive Distortions and Mental Illness. 
Depression. 
According to Beck’s (1967; 1976) cognitive model of depression, cognitive 
distortions play a significant role in the etiology and maintenance of depression.  
Throughout relevant research, when grouped data are compared, individuals suffering 
from depression have consistently displayed greater levels of cognitive distortion than 
non-depressed individuals (Marton, Churchard, & Kutcher, 1993; Swallow & Kupier, 
1990).  As stated previously, for individuals coping with depression, cognitive distortions 
tend to involve absolutist thinking, increased negative cognitions about the self, and 
revolve around themes of loss, deprivation, and personal inadequacy (Burns & Eidelson, 
1998; Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991).  The negative automatic thoughts represent those 
cognitive distortions of decreased self-worth and all-or-nothing exaggerated thinking 
when interpreting external events (Leung & Wong, 1998).  Leung and Wong (1998) 
found that when interpreting external events, these cognitive distortions tend to center 
around internalizing the problem instead of externalizing the problem.  Internalizing the 
problem pertains to the belief that the individual, himself or herself, is the cause of the 
negative event but externalizing the problem is the belief that external factors are the root 
of one’s difficulties (Leung & Wong, 1998).  The researchers examined four cognitive 
distortions, catastrophizing, personalizing, overgeneralization, and selective abstraction, 
across a community sample and a clinical sample.  The results suggested a strong 
association between the four distortions and internalizing problems.  Following a stressful 
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external event, depression can develop if an individual holds negative, absolutist 
cognitive distortions about the self (Beck, 1967; 1976; Leung & Wong, 1998; Burns & 
Eidelson, 1998). 
Martin and Kutcher (1994) examined the prevalence of cognitive distortion in a 
sample of 94 depressed adolescent psychiatric outpatients.  The study examined the 
variation in prevalence of cognitive distortion, depending on the severity of depressive 
symptoms.  The study compared depressed individuals with high levels of cognitive 
distortion with those with low levels of cognitive distortion.  Based on the results of the 
study, the researchers concluded there was a relationship between cognitive distortion 
and multiple factors of depression (e.g. more severe symptomatology, a lack of social 
self-confidence, and greater introversion).  The results emphasize a link between greater 
intensity of cognitive distortion and more severe depression in adolescents (Martin & 
Kutcher, 1994). 
Cognitive distortion has also been identified as a factor of depression in patients 
suffering from chronic pain.  Previous studies have found that chronic pain patients who 
have a poor understanding of their pain problems and  generalized cognitive distortions, 
tend to have increased levels of depression (Smith, Aberger, Follick, & Ahern, 1986; 
Smith, Peck, Milano, & Ward, 1988; Lefebvre, 1981).  Smith, O’Keeffe, and Christenson 
(1994) examined the relationship between cognitive distortions and depression in a 
sample of chronic pain sufferers.  The results suggested that chronic pain patients and 
non-pain patients with depression reported more cognitive distortion than non-depressed 
pain patients and normal controls.  The researchers concluded that their results supported 
the cognitive theory explanation of the impact of cognitive distortions on depression and 
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that the theory was relevant to chronic pain patients (Smith, O’Keeffe, & Christenson, 
1994).   
Lefebvre (1981) found similar results in a sample of patients suffering from 
chronic low back pain.  The patients in the study were grouped into four categories, 
depressed psychiatric patients, depressed low back pain patients, non-depressed low back 
pain patients, and non-depressed persons without low back pain.  The researcher 
measured four types of cognitive errors: catastrophizing, overgeneralization, 
personalization, and selective abstraction.  The results indicated that depressed patients, 
with or without low back pain, endorsed all cognitive errors significantly more strongly 
than those non-depressed patients.  The researcher concluded that depression in low back 
pain patients is a factor both of low back pain and of cognitive errors (Lefebvre, 1981). 
Beck’s (1967; 1976) original cognitive model was developed to explain the 
effects of schema, cognitive distortion, and negative automatic thoughts on the 
progression of depression.  Research has found supporting evidence that cognitive 
distortion is an important factor in the etiology and exacerbation of depression in 
adolescents, adults, and chronic pain patients (Beck, 1967; 1976; Leung & Wong, 1998; 
Martin & Kutcher, 1994; Smith, Aberger, Follick, & Ahern, 1986; Smith, Peck, Milano, 
& Ward, 1988; Lefebvre, 1981; Smith, O’Keeffe, & Christenson, 1994; Abela, & 
D’Alessandro, 2002).  Following the outpouring of research supporting Beck’s cognitive 
theory of depression, researchers examined the role of cognitive distortion in the 
development of other emotional disorders, such as anxiety. 
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Anxiety. 
Cognitive distortions have also been linked to anxiety disorders (Burns & 
Eidelson, 1998; Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Clark & Beck, 2010; Beck & Clark, 1988).  As 
stated previously, for those coping with anxiety, cognitive distortions tend to be 
probabilistic in nature and consist of perceptions of possible future psychological or 
physical harm (Burns & Eidelson, 1998).  Based on the information-processing model, 
Ingram and Kendall (1987) suggest that sufferers of anxiety disorders have schemas 
pertaining to threat.  The researchers propose the schema of anxious individuals shift 
between cognitive distortions of the self to distortions of their external worlds.  Ingram 
and Kendall believe that when a perceived threat is absent, anxious individuals have 
schema consisting of propositions relevant to the self (e.g. individuals see themselves as 
anxious or fearful).  However, while experiencing a perceived threatening or dangerous 
situation, “a relative shift occurs away from the self-schema to schema designed to 
facilitate the processing of danger cues either externally in the environment or internally 
within the self” (Ingram & Kendall, 1987, p. 5).  Essentially, when confronted with an 
anxiety-provoking situation, anxious schema trigger cognitive distortions pertaining to 
the processing of external stimuli as threatening, but when not experiencing an anxious 
situation, the individual has schema operations that define anxious features about the self. 
In comparison with depression, Ingram and Kendall (1987) suggest that instead of 
automatic negative thinking, as found in depressed patients, anxiety sufferers tend to have 
automatic negative questioning.  In automatic thinking, the focus is on absolutist 
conclusions and statements, such as “I am a failure,” whereas with automatic questioning, 
the thoughts focus on questions about personal adequacy in the situation, such as “What 
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will they think of me?” or “Are they laughing at me?”  Based on previous negative 
cognitive processing, research has suggested that the cognitive content of anxiety 
sufferers tends to be distorted when they question the future (Kendall & Hollon, 1989).  
Individuals who perceive themselves as unable to cope with threatening situations or 
those who interpret present or future situations as harmful may develop some form of 
anxiety disorder. 
Leitenberg, Yost, & Carroll-Wilson (1986) examined anxiety in a sample of 
school children in fourth, sixth, and eighth grades.  The study compared cognitive errors 
in children with high evaluation anxiety, operationalized as high scores on the Test 
Anxiety Scale for Children, with children with low evaluation anxiety.  The researchers 
found that children with high evaluation anxiety endorsed significantly higher levels of 
cognitive errors than did children with low evaluation anxiety (Leitenberg et al., 1986).  
Weems, Berman, Silverman, and Saavedra (2001) found similar results in a sample of 
adolescents.  The researchers examined the relationship between cognitive errors and 
different aspects of anxiety (trait, manifestation, and sensitivity) in a sample of 
adolescents suffering from an anxiety or phobic disorder.  Results of the study indicated 
that each of the measures of anxiety was significantly correlated to each of the cognitive 
errors, including catastrophizing, overgeneralization, personalization, and selective 
abstraction.  The researchers concluded that findings “support a cognitive model of 
anxiety which posits that such emotional disturbances are characterized by faulty or 
negative ways of thinking” (Weems et al., 2001, p. 572).  Wells (1997) further supports 
the finding that anxious patients present with cognitive biases or distortions.  Wells 
identified such cognitive distortions as dichotomous thinking, mental filtering, 
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catastrophizing, and personalization in patients suffering from anxiety disorders.  
Although research tends to focus on depression and anxiety when examining cognitive 
distortions, thinking errors have been found to influence other disorders as well. 
Other Axis I and Axis II Disorders. 
Cognitive distortions have been described in the literature on problem behaviors 
in adolescents (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2011), eating disorders 
(Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, & Rachman, 1999), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
(Rachman & Shafran, 1999), gambling addictions (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, 
Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997), and sex offenses (Ward, Hudson, Johnstons, & Marshall, 
1997; Ward, 2000). 
Cognitive distortions are found not only in Axis I disorders but have also been 
identified in Axis II disorders.  A common cognitive distortion found in patients with 
Dependent Personality Disorder is dichotomous thinking, whereas patients struggling 
with Borderline Personality Disorder tend to use catastrophic thinking and perfectionism 
in addition to dichotomous thinking (Freeman, Pretzer, Fleming, & Simon, 1990; Layden, 
Newman, Freeman, & Morse, 1993).  Beck, Freeman, Davis, and associates (2004) found 
that patients with Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Obsessive Compulsive Personality 
Disorders also utilized cognitive distortions. 
In summary, cognitive distortion is an important factor in the etiology, 
maintenance, and exacerbation of many Axis I and Axis II disorders.  Due to extensive 
research providing evidence for the presence of cognitive distortions in mental illness, a 
range of measures were developed to identify such thinking errors.  These measures, 
which were developed to identify cognitive components of mental illness, can aid in the 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  26 
development of more effective treatments.  The following is a review of current measures 
of cognitive distortions. 
Measures of Cognitive Distortion.      
Five clinical instruments, which were specifically designed to measure the general 
construct of cognitive distortion, were found throughout the literature.  The five 
instruments were the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ, Hollon & Kendall, 
1980), Cognitive Errors Questionnaire (CEQ, Lefebvre, 1981), Cognitive Distortion 
Scale (CDS, Briere, 2000), Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS, Weissman & Beck, 
1978), and the measure currently being investigated, the Inventory of Cognitive 
Distortions (ICD, Yurica, 2002; DiTomasso & Yurica, 2011). 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire consists of 30 items, designed to measure 
the frequency of occurrence of automatic negative self-statements associated with 
depression (Hollon & Kendall, 1980).  The individual is asked to think about how often 
in the past week he or she has experienced certain automatic thoughts, using a Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 = “not-at-all” to 5 = “all-the-time”.  The total score is derived from 
the sum of all 30 items.  Initially, 788 male and female undergraduate students were 
asked to recall a specific life experience which they found to be depressing and to record 
their automatic thoughts and reactions.  The researchers then selected the 100 most 
common thoughts and generated the initial ATQ-100.  The initial ATQ was further 
examined for item selection and cross-validation by comparing the scores of 348 
undergraduate students across four measures, the ATQ, the Beck Depression Inventory 
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(BDI), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Depression scale (MMPI-D), 
and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) A-Trait scale.  
Following the second administration of the ATQ, 30 items were found to 
differentiate between depressed and non-depressed participants (Hollon & Kendall, 
1980).  On each of the 30 negative self-statements, the depressed participants reported 
significantly more occurrences of negative thought than non-depressed participants.  A 
significant relationship was found between the ATQ and the BDI and MMPI-D, with 
correlations falling within the moderate to high range (r’s range from .45-.70).  The 
significant correlation between the ATQ and the STAI-trait scale (r = .79) was 
unexpected because the authors believed the ATQ would have been able to differentiate 
between self-reported depression and self-reported anxiety.  In regard to reliability, both 
split half reliability, odd versus even items, and coefficient alpha were calculated and 
found to be significant (.97 and .96 respectively).  The authors concluded the ATQ to 
have sufficient internal reliability and concurrent validity and justified its use as a 
measure of depression-related automatic negative thoughts (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). 
The construct validity of the measure was supported by findings that depressed 
clinical samples reported more negative automatic thoughts than nonclinical samples 
(Dobson & Breiter, 1982).  The ATQ was further validated using a clinical sample of 
mental health center patients and of medical center patients (Harrell & Ryon, 1983).  
Once again the ATQ was able to differentiate between depressed and non-depressed 
patients and the measure correlated significantly with the BDI and MMPI-D.  The split 
half reliability and coefficient alpha were similar to that of the Hollon and Kendall (1980) 
study, thus further emphasizing the measure’s reliability.  The use of the ATQ has also 
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been validated for assessing negative automatic thoughts associated with depression in 
children, adolescents, and adults both in clinical and in non-clinical samples (Kazdin, 
1990: Dent & Teasdale, 1988; Dobson & Breiter, 1982; Dohr, Rush & Bernstein, 1989; 
Harrell & Ryan, 1983; Ross, Gottfredson, Christensen & Weaver, 1986). 
A revised version of the measure (ATQ-R) was published in 1989 and included 
positive and neutral self-statements to the already established negative self-statements 
(Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989).  The revised measure continued to differentiate 
between depressed and non-depressed participants, but it also accounted for significantly 
more variance than the original ATQ alone (Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989; Burgess & 
Haaga, 1994).  The positive statements were added, based on the cognitive model’s 
proposition that depressed mood is linked to the presence of negative thoughts along with 
the absence of positive thoughts. 
Cognitive Errors Questionnaire. 
The Cognitive Errors Questionnaire (CEQ) was initially designed to coincide with 
the Low Back Pain Cognitive Errors Questionnaire (LBP-CEQ).  The measures were 
developed to investigate the application of the cognitive theory of depression in 
depressed psychiatric patients, depressed low back pain patients, non-depressed low back 
pain patients, and non-depressed persons without low back pain (Lefebvre, 1981).  The 
questionnaire, which was designed to measure the general level of cognitive distortion, is 
also capable of measuring four specific types of cognitive errors: catastrophizing, 
overgeneralization, personalization, and selective abstraction.  The results indicated that 
participants with or without low back pain, who were also suffering from depression, 
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endorsed significantly more cognitive errors than non-depressed patients (Lefebvre, 
1981). 
The general CEQ is composed of 24 vignettes, two to three lines long that 
describe daily life situations; each is followed by a negative thought about the vignette, 
reflecting one of the four cognitive distortions.  Respondents are asked to rate whether or 
not each negative thought is comparable with the ways in which they would react in a 
similar situation, as described by the vignette.  The rating is made on a 5-point Likert-
type scale, ranging from 1 = “almost exactly as I would think” to 5 = “not at all as I 
would think”.  To ensure respondents react to a wide range of situations, the context of 
the vignettes is divided equally across work, family, home, and recreational settings.  A 
second section was added to the general CEQ to measure negative cognitions in patients 
with low back pain (Lefebvre, 1981).  The LBP-CEQ also consisted of 24 vignettes 
followed by a negative cognition. 
Original examination of the CEQ found the measure to have high test-retest 
reliability (r’s range from .80-.85), alternate forms reliability (r’s range from .76-.82), 
and internal consistency reliability (r’s range from .89-.92).  Research findings also 
indicate that the CEQ was able to distinguish between the depressed and non-depressed 
in a sample of older adults and pain patients (Scogin, Hamblin, & Beutler, 1986; Smith, 
O’Keefe, & Christensen, 1994).  A study investigating depression in chronic low back 
pain patients utilized the CEQ to determine if cognitive distortions were a factor of 
somatization or of general distress (Smith, Aberger, Follick, & Ahern, 1986).  The 
cognitive distortions as recorded by the CEQ were significantly correlated with the 
MMPI Depression, Psychasthenia, and Schizophrenia subscales, but it was not associated 
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with the Hypochondriasis or Hysteria subscales.  The researchers concluded that the CEQ 
demonstrated cognitive distortions as being a factor of distress, related to depression, but 
not a factor of somatization (Smith et al., 1986).   
In order to incorporate somatization symptoms into the subscale to assess, 
comprehensively, the cognitive errors of those patients suffering from low back pain, 
Moss-Morris and Petrie (1997) developed a shorter and revised version of the CEQ.  The 
CEQ-R contains 12 items that assess general cognitive errors and also a 9-item subscale 
that assesses somatic complaints.  The researchers gathered data for the CEQ-R from 141 
patients suffering from various chronic pain symptoms and also from healthy controls.  
The total, semantic, and general subscales of the CEQ-R demonstrated high reliability 
across those participants with pain symptoms (r = .95, .93, .90 respectively).  The 
modified measure also demonstrated strong discriminate validity evidenced by the ability 
to distinguish between pain sufferers with depression and healthy controls (Morris & 
Petrie, 1997). 
The CEQ was also revised to assess cognitive distortions in children.  Leitenberg, 
Yost, and Carrol-Wilson (1986) developed the Children’s Negative Cognitive Error 
Questionnaire (CNCEQ) to examine four types of cognitive errors in children.  The four 
cognitive errors are similar to the adult CEQ because both measures include 
overgeneralizing, catastrophizing, personalization, and selective abstraction.  Researchers 
originally used a normative sample consisting of fourth, sixth, and eighth-grade students 
and found that generally these children did not report a significant level of negative 
thinking across any of the cognitive errors.  Test-retest reliability of the total CNCEQ 
was found to be moderate and the internal consistency reliability was found to be high (r 
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= .65, Cronbach’s alpha = .89).  The test-retest reliability was weaker than Lefebvre’s 
(1981) original CEQ measure for adults (r = .85).   
Further studies found that when the CNCEQ was used to assess children with 
self-reported symptoms of depression, low self-esteem, and anxiety, these children 
endorsed significantly more cognitive errors than did their non-depressed, high self-
esteem, and non-anxious counterparts (Leitenberg, Yost, & Carrol-Wilson, 1986).  
However, results have been inconclusive when using the CNCEQ to investigate the 
relationship of distorted thinking and affective disorders in adolescents (Messer, 
Kempton, Van Hasselt, Null & Bukstein, 1994), to identify common cognitive errors in 
social anxiety and depression (Epkins, 1996), and to better understand customary 
cognitive distortions in child psychopathology (Leung & Poon, 2001).  Across studies 
and populations, versions of the CEQ tend to have strong validity and varying reliability 
when measuring four specific cognitive errors (Lefebvre, 1981; Scogin, Hamblin, & 
Beutler, 1986; Morris & Petrie, 1997; Leitenberg, Yost, & Carrol-Wilson, 1986; Smith, 
Aberger, Follick, & Ahern, 1986).  Although the CEQ has been validated and revised to 
measure cognitive errors across a range of populations and differing illnesses, the 
measure is capable of evaluating only four cognitive errors. 
Cognitive Distortions Scale. 
The Cognitive Distortions Scale (CDS) is the most recently developed measure of 
cognitive distortion, besides the Inventory of Cognitive Distortion (ICD) (Briere, 2000). 
The instrument was developed because the author felt that previous measures of negative 
ideations were limited by a number of factors such as age range restrictions, limited 
number of items, poorly defined constructs, and questionable accuracy in distinguishing 
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between cognitive distortions and mood states (Briere, 2000).  The CDS, which is a 40-
item, self-assessment of cognitive distortion for adults, comprises items in the form of 
short phrases, each representing a dysfunctional thought or feeling.  The individual is 
asked to rate how often he or she has had these different thoughts and feelings in the last 
month; the measure uses a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “never” to 5 = 
“very often”.  The instrument is said to measure five scales, each considered to be a 
cognitive distortion; these include self-criticism, self-blame, helplessness, hopelessness, 
and preoccupation with danger (Briere, 2000).  Each factor consists of eight items; the 
raw scores are converted into T-scores, and if T is equal to or greater than 70, that 
particular distortion would be considered clinically significant. The measure is brief and 
simple to score, taking only 10 to 15 minutes to administer and approximately five 
minutes to score. 
The CDS was evaluated using a normative sample of 611 individuals from the 
general population.  Internal consistency reliability for the fives scales was high and 
ranged from .89 to .97 and an overall mean alpha of .93.  Construct validity was 
examined by comparing the CDS scale scores with three measures of depression, the 
Multiscore Depression Inventory (MDI), the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), 
and the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI).  All tests yielded relatively high correlations, 
supporting the validity of the CDS (Briere, 2000).  Owens, Chard, & Cox (2008) used the 
CDS to evaluate cognitive distortions in returning Veterans suffering from Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD).  The CDS was administered to a sample of 99 veterans and the 
results suggested high internal consistency reliability for each subscale, with reliability 
coefficients ranging from .81 to .94.  The CDS was able to track changes in cognitive 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  33 
distortion and depression across pre- and post-treatment evaluations (Owens, Chard, & 
Cox, 2008).  The CDS has also been found to distinguish between female patients with 
dual diagnoses of PTSD and substance abuse disorder; these individuals have more 
cognitive distortions than female patients with a single diagnosis (Najavits, Gotthardt, 
Weiss, & Epstein’s, 2004).  Although studies have found the CDS to be reliable in 
assessing cognitive distortions in PTSD patients, there remains a dearth of literature 
about utilizing the CDS in clinical practice. 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale. 
The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) is an instrument consisting of 40-items 
designed to identify and measure dysfunctional attitudes, particularly those that may 
relate to depression (Weissman & Beck, 1978; Weissman, 1979).  The instrument is 
constructed of single-sentence items and is said to measure seven value systems including 
approval, love, achievement, perfectionism, entitlement, omnipotence, and autonomy.  
Answers to the items are reported on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = “totally agree” 
to 7 = “totally disagree”.  The DAS provides a single-scaled score ranging from 40 to 
280, with lower scores indicating more adaptive attitudes and higher scores representing 
more dysfunctional attitudes.  Weissman (1979) designed the DAS by basing items on 
Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory of depression.  The items were constructed based on 
Beck’s six original cognitive errors: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, 
overgeneralization, magnification, personalization, and dichotomous reasoning.  
Throughout Weissman’s development and validation of the DAS, the term dysfunctional 
attitude was used synonymously with thinking errors and cognitive distortions. 
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The DAS was originally evaluated using a sample of 355 undergraduate and 
graduate students in psychology.  Two versions of the measure (A and B) were created 
from a sample of 100 items and both of these were validated using the student sample 
(Weissman, 1979).  The instrument was found to have high internal consistency 
reliability, with alphas ranging from .84 to .92.  The DAS also demonstrated significant 
test-retest correlations, .80 to .84, over an 8-week period, suggesting excellent stability.  
In regards to concurrent validity, the DAS was found to correlate significantly with the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).  Similar results were found using the DAS-A when 
examining the instrument’s properties in a separate sample of undergraduate students 
(Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, & Kuiper, 1986).  Oliver and Baumgart (1985) also found results 
in support of the DAS in a sample of hospital employees and spouses.  Test-retest 
reliability was good following a 16-week period (r = .73) and the DAS again correlated 
with the BDI (r = .41).  
Beck, Brown, Steer, and Weissman (1991) examined the use of the DAS for 
identifying dysfunctional attitudes in a clinical population.  The results lent further 
support for the factor structure of the DAS.  Nelson, Stern, and Cicchetti (1992) also 
evaluated the functionality of the DAS with a population of depressed and non-depressed 
individuals.  The relationship between versions A and B was stronger when used with a 
clinical population (r = .92) than with a student population as originally examined by 
Weissman and Beck (1978) (r = .79).  Scores on the two versions of the DAS were also 
found to have a stronger correlation within the depressed sample (r = .94) than within the 
non-depressed sample (r = .84).   
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The DAS continues to be revised and shortened throughout the literature, with 
consistent results in regard to validity and reliability. The DAS-A was revised using a 
large community sample of 8,960 participants.  The researchers found support for a 
shortened version of the DAS-A consisting of only 17 questions; this revised form held 
strong reliability and validity as evidenced by the ability to distinguish between depressed 
and non-depressed participants (Graaf, Roelofs, & Huibers, 2009).  Beevers, Strong, 
Meyer, Pilkonis, and Miller (2007) evaluated both forms of the DAS in a sample of 
depressed participants and generated 9-item versions of each.  Both short forms were 
highly correlated with the original 40-item DAS-A, with correlations ranging from .91 to 
.93.  Following the participants over the course of treatment, the brief versions identified 
similar amounts of change in symptomatology as did the original DAS.  The researchers 
concluded that the two shortened versions of the DAS provided accurate and efficient 
assessment results of dysfunctional attitudes among depressed individuals (Beevers et al., 
2007).   
The DAS is a widely used instrument for assessing dysfunctional attitudes in both 
clinical and nonclinical populations. Across a variety of investigations, the DAS has been 
used to investigate dysfunctional attitudes, such as dysfunctional attitudes and its relation 
to problem solving abilities (Otto, Fava, Penava, & Bless, 1997), psychosis and substance 
abuse (Graham, 1998), interpersonal behavioral issues (Whisman & Freedman, 1998), 
depression (Oliver, Murphy, Ferland, & Ross, 2007), bipolar disorder (Scott, Stanton, 
Garland, Ferrier, 2000; Lam, Wright, & Smith, 2004), and panic disorder (Ohrt, Sjodin, 
& Thorell, 1999). 
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Limitations of Prior Cognitive Distortion Measures. 
Based on a review of the literature, previous measures of cognitive distortions had 
common limitations; Yurica, (2002), therefore, developed the Inventory of Cognitive 
Distortions.  Yurica believed that a more standardized measure of cognitive distortion is 
necessary in order to address previous instruments’ poor consensus of defining cognitive 
distortions, variable measurement across instruments, outdated measurement, and limited 
applicability and scope; with a standardized measure in place there is the potential for 
advancement in cognitive therapy.   
A common limitation across all four previous measures is the lack of specificity 
in the terms used to describe cognitive distortions.  The variety in definition can be seen 
in Weissman’s (1979) description of the DAS because the terms “belief,” “schema,” 
“cognitive distortions,” “thinking errors,” and “dysfunctional attitudes” are used 
interchangeably. Also, two of the most commonly used measures of cognitive distortions, 
the DAS and ATQ, tend to measure the exact content of thoughts, as opposed to the 
actual error or process that leads to the automatic thought (Covin, Dozois, Ogniewicz, & 
Seeds, 2011).  Both measures examine specific automatic thoughts rather than the 
underlying processes that cause distorted thinking.  Previous instruments also vary on the 
types of cognitive distortions that each measures (Weissman, 1979; Hollon & Kendall, 
1980; Briere, 2000).  There is a lack of specificity concerning those constructs that should 
be measured and how those cognitive distortions should be defined. 
Previous measures of cognitive distortion were also limited in their scope and 
applicability because all instruments focused primarily on depressive disorders (Yurica, 
2002).  Since the development of the earlier instruments, cognitive theory has expanded 
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beyond depression and cognitive distortion has been identified as an important factor in 
the maintenance of other Axis I and Axis II psychological disorders.  Also, some of the 
instruments were developed as total score measures and provide only information 
regarding overall level of cognitive distortion.  Based on previous literature, Yurica 
(2002) believed “previous measures did not provide relevant clinical information in terms 
of categorizing and identifying specific types of cognitive distortions” (p. 56).  
In summary, the ICD was developed to better address the clinical utility of 
identifying and defining the usage of specific cognitive distortions.  The ICD, which is 
based on a unified definition of cognitive distortions, is standardized and offers consistent 
measurement; it incorporates updated information regarding the role that cognitive 
distortions play in multiple psychological disorders, and has more generalized 
applicability and scope (Yurica, 2002). 
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions. 
The ICD is a 69-item measure that describes 11 types of cognitive distortions.  
The instrument, which is easy to administer, takes approximately 15 to 20 minutes to 
complete, and can be used with people ages 18 and older.  DiTomasso and Yurica (2011) 
emphasize that the ICD is not a diagnostic measure and should not be used as the only 
means of assessing clinical symptoms.  This tool is a method of examining patients’ 
cognitive distortions, which may be intensifying a clinical condition, or making an 
individual susceptible to future psychological difficulties.  DiTomasso and Yurica also 
suggest the potential clinical value of the ICD.  The researchers describe the instrument’s 
utility as being fourfold: (1) it is a method of identifying patients’ forms of distorted 
thinking, (2) it can identify patients’ uses of particular cognitive distortions for particular 
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diagnoses, (3) it can provide clinicians with a tool that focuses on improving patients’ 
meta-cognitive skills, including educating patients on cognitive distortions’ role in 
psychological disorders, and (4) it can be used to assess changes in patients’ distorted 
thinking patterns throughout treatment by measuring cognitive distortions pre-, post-, and 
during treatment. 
  The principal investigation and development of the ICD used a sample of 188 
patients from two outpatient clinics, with 66 participants composing a control group 
(Yurica, 2002).  Following a factor analysis, 11 factors were retained.  The 11 factors 
were said to measure the following cognitive distortions: (1) externalization of self-
worth, (2) fortune-telling, (3) magnification, (4) labeling, (5) perfectionism, (6) 
comparison with others, (7) emotional reasoning, (8) arbitrary inference/jumping to 
conclusions, (9) emotional reasoning and decision making, (10) minimization, and (11) 
mind-reading.  In a separate study that utilized the ICD to assess the relationship between 
cognitive distortions and burnout in nurses, Diefenbeck (2005) found further evidence to 
support this factor structure.  Yurica (2002) investigated the ICD’s test-retest reliability 
and total scale internal reliability.  The total scale coefficient alpha demonstrated high 
internal consistency reliability (.98) and following a five-week interval, test-retest 
reliability was also found to have a high reliability coefficient (.998).  In regard to 
validity, the ICD correlated significantly with the DAS (r = .70) and with the BDI (r = 
.70).  These results suggested the higher the endorsement of cognitive distortions, the 
higher the frequency of dysfunctional thinking and the greater the endorsement of 
depressive symptoms (Yurica, 2002).  Also, the ICD was able to distinguish between 
depressed and non-depressed individuals, as well as differentiate between individuals 
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suffering from an anxiety disorder and individuals in a control group (Yurica, 2002; 
Rupertus, 2004). 
Rosenfield (2004) investigated the relationship between cognitive distortions and 
Axis I and Axis II psychopathology to examine the use of the ICD to determine the 
association between distorted cognitions and psychological distress.  The researcher 
found that individuals meeting criteria for any Axis I or Axis II disorders reported a 
higher frequency of cognitive distortion as measured by the ICD, than those individuals 
free of a psychological disorder.  Rosenfield found that approximately half of the 
variance both in the severity and in the number of psychological dysfunctions was 
accounted for by frequency of cognitive distortions.  The study found that when there 
was an increase in the number of clinical disorders for which an individual met the 
criterion as well as an increase in the severity of the Axis I condition, there was also an 
elevated frequency of engaging in cognitive distortion (Rosenfield, 2004). This same 
positive, incremental correlation was found when investigating the relationship between 
severity and quantity of Axis II personality disorders and frequency of cognitive 
distortions (Rosefield, 2004). This research lends further support for the ability of the 
ICD to differentiate between those with or those without psychological dysfunction; it 
also demonstrates the utility of the measure because there was a direct relationship 
between cognitive distortion and rate and severity of Axis I and Axis II psychopathology 
(Rosenfield, 2004). 
Last, Uhl (2007) investigated the utility of the ICD in a medical setting.  The 
researcher investigated the association between psychiatric and psychosocial factors that 
influence how patients deal with health problems and the frequency of cognitive 
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distortions as measured by the ICD.  The results suggested that the more frequently a 
patient engages in cognitive distortions, the more likely he or she is to engage in negative 
psychological and health risk behaviors.  Patients who were unlikely to have drug, eating, 
caffeine, inactivity, and smoking problems had significantly lower ICD scores than those 
likely to have such problems (Uhl, 2007).  Within a medical setting, the ICD was also 
found to be useful in identifying the relationships between distorted thinking and 
psychological and behavioral health risks, as well as the relationship between patterns of 
unhealthy behavior and cognitive distortions in those individuals who are obese (Goins, 
2008; Shook, 2010).  
In summary, the ICD has demonstrated good reliability and validity across 
different populations.  The instrument was able to differentiate among individuals 
suffering from anxiety or depression as well as to predict unhealthy lifestyles in a sample 
of medical patients, depending on the level of cognitive distortion (Yurica, 2002; 
Diefenbeck, 2005; Rosenfield, 2004; Uhl, 2007; Goins, 2008; Shook, 2010; Rupertus, 
2004).  Following its development, the ICD has been used to investigate cognitive 
distortions in a wide variety of settings, but there remains a dearth of research examining 
the psychometric properties of the instrument in a community sample, as well as 
examining its use in comparing cognitive distortions and perceived stress.  According to 
the diathesis-stress model, individuals’ cognitive distortions will only influence his or her 
information processing of external events during a situation perceived as stressful (Beck, 
1967).  In the absence of stress, cognitive distortions may remain inactive and not 
influence an individual’s pattern of thinking.  If this theory is correct, then the level of 
cognitive distortion as measured by the ICD should correlate with the level of perceived 
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stress.  If an individual has a high level of cognitive distortions, he or she should also 
perceive stressful situations as more stressful than individuals with a low level of 
distorted thinking. 
Cognitive Distortions and Stress. 
The diathesis-stress model of emotional disorders provides support for better 
understanding the relationship between stress and cognitive distortions (Beck, 1967).  
Deal and Williams (1998) investigated whether or not cognitive distortion mediates 
between life stress and depressive symptoms in a sample of high school students.  The 
researchers predicted that the DAS and ATQ measures of cognitive distortion would be 
better predictors of depression, as measured by the BDI, than life stress.  Their prediction 
was supported because adolescents with high levels of cognitive distortions had more 
depressive tendencies than those with low levels of cognitive distortions (Deal & 
Williams, 1998).  Researchers also found that cognitive distortions influenced the 
perceived stressfulness of life events.  Those adolescents with higher levels of cognitive 
distortion tended to perceive life events as more stressful (Deal & Williams, 1998).  This 
research lends support for the diathesis-stress model because individuals with high levels 
of cognitive distortion tended to interpret life situations as more stressful and were more 
susceptible to depressive symptoms.  Without the underlying cognitive distortions to 
mediate individuals’ experiences, life events may not appear as stressful and depressive 
symptoms may not develop. 
Studies examining depression involving chronic pain patients have also found 
support for the relationship between stress, cognitive distortion, and depression (Smith, 
O’Keefe, & Christensen, 1994; Lefebvre, 1981).  The researchers concluded that 
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depression arises in response to the stress of chronic pain (Smith, O’Keefe, & 
Christensen, 1994).  When faced with a stressful event, emotional responses are 
processed based on underlying cognitive distortions, which can lead to emotional 
disorders. 
Interestingly, Hammen (1978) found different results when investigating the 
relationship between distorted thinking, life stress, and depression.  Five hundred and 
twenty-two undergraduate male and female students completed a measure of depression 
(BDI), life stress (Life Events Inventory), and distorted thinking (unpublished measure of 
cognitive distortion).  The results indicated that depressed and non-depressed individuals 
presented different patterns of distortion depending on level of life stress.  Interestingly, 
among depressed individuals, low life stress was associated with greater distortion than 
was high life stress (Hammen, 1978).  This finding differs from the results of the Deal 
and Williams (1998) study.  Hammen concluded that life stress, distorted thinking, and 
depression are related, but that the relationship requires further investigation with 
psychometrically sound instruments to measure both cognitive distortions and life stress, 
as was noted in the limitations section.   
Previous research emphasizes the necessity to understand the relationship 
between cognitive distortion, stress and depression as well as the need for more 
evidenced-based instruments (Deal & Williams, 1998; Hammen, 1978; Smith, O’Keefe, 
& Christensen, 1994). 
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Perceived Stress Scale. 
Development and Background. 
For the current study, a measure of perceived stress was required in order to 
examine the relationship between stress and cognitive distortions.  Cohen, Kamarck, and 
Mermelstein (1983) developed a global measure of perceived stress called the Perceive 
Stress Scale (PSS).  The researchers felt at that time there were no measures of stress that 
incorporated an individual’s perception of the event’s stressfulness and that a global 
measure of how one perceives stressful events could be important in determining the 
relationship between stress and pathology (Cohen et al., 1983).  The researchers felt that 
most measures of stress were objective, which implies that actual events are the 
precipitating cause of pathology and illness-related behavior instead of how the event is 
perceived and interpreted.  The researchers’ argument is that the perception of stress is 
due to the cognitively mediated emotional response to the objective event and not simply 
to the event itself.   
The PSS “measures the degree to which situations in one’s life are appraised as 
stressful” (Cohen et al., 1983, p. 385).  The instrument was designed to measure how 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloading people find their lives to be; each of these 
tends to be essential components of the experience of stress (Cohen, 1978; Seligman, 
1975).  The PSS also has direct items about the current level of experienced stress.  In 
comparison with life event scales, which record a respondent’s objective view of whether 
or not an event is stressful, the PSS is a more direct measure of the level of stress 
experienced.  The researchers presume that “it is this level of appraised stress, not the 
objective occurrence of the events that determines one’s response to a stressor” (Cohen et 
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al., 1983, p. 387).  The authors also consider the measure to be more global than previous 
instruments because it is sensitive to chronic stress from ongoing life circumstances, 
stress from expectations concerning future events, and reactions to specific events. 
The PSS, a 14-item measure of perceived stress, is a scale that can be 
administered in only a few minutes.  It was designed for community use, requiring 
respondents to have at least a junior high school education.  The properties of the PSS 
were originally examined with two samples of college students and a sample of 
participants in a smoking cessation program.  Coefficient alpha reliability for the scale 
was .84 and .85 in the college samples and .86 in the smoking cessation sample, 
demonstrating good reliability (Cohen et al., 1983).  The PSS was a better predictor of 
both depressive and physical symptomatology than were the scores on a stressful life 
events measure.  Scores on the PSS predicted utilization of health services, positively 
correlated with social anxiety, and positively correlated with cigarette smoking behavior 
(Cohen et al., 1983).  The scale also demonstrated good convergent validity by relating to 
a life-event impact score, which is based to some degree on appraisal of life events.  The 
authors concluded that the PSS has adequate internal and test-retest reliability and also 
correlated in the expected manner with a range of self-report and behavioral criteria 
(Cohen et al., 1983). 
Evidence Supporting Use of Perceived Stress Scale. 
Cohen (1988) examined the properties of the PSS in a probability sample to 
ensure the scale was sensitive enough to detect stress in a nonclinical sample.  Stress is 
often a precursor or mediator of pathology; therefore, being able to identify high levels of 
stress in a nonclinical sample may aid clinicians in preventing the development of 
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symptoms.  After collecting data from over 2,000 participants, Cohen found that the PSS 
was able to predict a range of health-related outcomes associated with perceived stress.  
Roberti, Harrington, and Storch (2006) found similar findings in support of the PSS in a 
sample of undergraduate students.  The researchers used a 10-item version of the PSS, 
instead of the original 14-item, and the results suggested that the instrument measured 
two factors relating to stress.  These factors were (1) perceived helplessness and (2) 
perceived self-efficacy.  The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the PSS-10 and 
the two factors were high, suggesting strong internal consistency (Total Score = .89; 
Perceived Helplessness = .85; Perceived Self-Efficacy = .82).  The PSS-10 demonstrated 
good convergent validity after correlating significantly with the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI); the instrument also demonstrated good divergent validity as evidenced 
by an insignificant correlation with the Sensation Seeking Scale, Form V (SSS-V), which 
measures a persons desire to participate in adventure seeking behaviors (Roberti et al., 
2006).  After evaluating the properties of the PSS in a nonclinical sample, research turned 
to investigating the use of the scale in a clinical sample. 
Pbert, Doerfler, and DeCosimo (1992) used the original 14-item PSS scale to 
examine the relationship between perceived stress and psychosocial dysfunction in two 
clinical samples.  These samples were individuals participating in a health promotion 
program and individuals who were currently participating in a 12-week outpatient cardiac 
rehabilitation program.  The researchers compared scores on the PSS with scores on the 
Life Experience Scale (LES) to determine which scale is a better predictor of 
psychological and physical distress. As stated previously, the PSS measures an 
individual’s stress appraisal (perceived stress), whereas the LES instrument is an 
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objective measure of stressful events (life event scores) (Cohen et al., 1983).  Research 
suggests that objective features of events, or the desirability of life events, are less 
important in determining the degree to which individuals experience stress than are the 
individuals’ judgments or appraisals of the events (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Pbert, 
Doerfler, and DeCosimo found across samples, that perceived stress, as measured by the 
PSS, was significantly related to self-reported negative affect and physical symptoms.  
The PSS and the LES were only moderately correlated, suggesting that the two scales 
measure different aspects of stress.  The researchers concluded that perceived stress was a 
better predictor of affective and physical symptoms than an objective measure of stress  
(Pbert et al., 1992).   
Hewitt, Flett, and Mosher (1992) investigated the relationship between perceived 
stress and depressive symptoms in a sample of severely depressed patients.  The results 
suggested that scores on the PSS were predictive of scores on the BDI.  High total scores 
of perceived stress were predictive of more symptoms of depression.  The researchers 
concluded that the PSS is a multidimensional and internally consistent measure of 
perceived stress (Hewitt et al., 1992).   
The properties of the PSS-14 have also been examined following the translation 
of the scale into Japanese and Spanish.  The Japanese version was administered to 23 
native Japanese speakers and the scale was found to have high internal consistency 
reliability.  Also, when compared with the English version of the scale, the two versions 
had almost identical factor structures, with the Japanese version adding support for the 
two-factor model of the PSS, perceived helplessness and perceived self-efficacy (Mimura 
& Griffiths, 2004).  The Spanish version of the PSS was found to have high internal 
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consistency reliability across two studies (alphas equaling .81 and .83) as well as strong 
test-retest reliability (r = .73) (Remor, 2006; Teresa, Ramirez, & Hernandez, 2007).  Of 
the two studies examining the Spanish version of the PSS, one found a similar factor 
structure, compared with the English version, and the other found high internal 
consistency reliability (alpha = .82) and high test-retest reliability (r = .77) for the 
Spanish version of the PSS-10 (Remor, 2006; Teresa, Ramirez, & Hernandez, 2007). 
Throughout the literature, the PSS has demonstrated its effectiveness in 
measuring perceived stress and has also established a link between stress and 
psychological symptoms (Roberti et al., 2006; Pbert et al., 1992; Hewitt et al., 1992; 
Remor, 2006; Teresa, Ramirez, & Hernandez, 2007; Mimura & Griffiths, 2004).  Based 
on the diathesis-stress model of emotional disorders, stress has been found to mediate the 
intensity of underlying cognitive distortions, but the relationship between stress, distorted 
thinking, and emotional disorders is in need of further research (Beck, 1967; Hammen, 
1978; Deal & Williams, 1998). 
Cognitive Distortions and Demographic Characteristics. 
There is a lack of literature regarding the idea that cognitive distortions vary by 
certain demographic characteristics.  For a majority of research involving the study of 
cognitive distortions, variability in distorted thinking across different participant 
characteristics is briefly mentioned.  The current study will examine how cognitive 
distortions and stress differ across demographic characteristics, as measured by the ICD.  
When evaluating the properties of a measure, it is important to understand whether or not 
the scores on the instrument vary, depending on common demographic differences such 
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as age, gender, and level of education.  This ensures proper use and interpretation of the 
measure in clinical practice. 
Based on a review of the literature regarding gender differences and cognitive 
distortions, Bruno (2010) concludes that research pertaining to the relationship between 
the two constructs is almost nonexistent.  Gender differences in cognitive distortions are 
rarely investigated and when this relationship is examined, the results are varied.  Sowa 
and Lustman (1984) explored gender differences in relation to depression, depressive 
cognitions and perception of stressful life events.  The researchers used the ATQ 
instrument, previously mentioned, and the results suggested that men exhibited greater 
distortions in cognitive content.  A year later, Oliver and Baumgart (1985) used the DAS 
to investigate gender differences in dysfunctional attitudes; based on the results, there 
were no significant differences between genders.  Although the two studies present 
conflicting results, different cognitive distortion measures were used, which may have 
caused the variation in the findings.  Bruno (2010) and Leung and Wong (1998) found 
slight gender differences in the type of cognitive distortions that are used by males and 
the type that are used by females.  Both studies found that males tend to externalize their 
problems using self-serving biases, whereas females tend to internalize their problems 
using self-debasing distortions (Bruno, 2010; Leung & Wong, 1998).  Further research is 
necessary to better understand the variation in findings regarding gender differences and 
cognitive distortions.      
Another construct being examined in the current study is stress. Relative to this 
aspect are the findings by Sowa and Lustman (1984), who found that women rated the 
impact of stressors more severely, but that men reported more stressful life change.  
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Cohen and colleagues (1983) found no gender differences in perceived stress when using 
the PSS to investigate perceived stress in a community sample.  Within a clinical sample, 
however, Hewitt and colleagues (1992) found a significant gender difference because 
women had higher stress levels than men.  Again, the studies may have used different 
measures of stress or may have examined different samples, both of which may have 
caused the variation in results.  Further investigation of gender differences in perceived 
stress would be beneficial to better understand the impact stress has on males and 
females.    
Currently there is a lack of literature discussing the prevalence and severity of 
cognitive distortion across age and level of education in a nonclinical sample.  The ICD 
allows for comparison of an overall level of cognitive distortion across the different 
demographic characteristics. 
 In summary, previous research has reached conflicting conclusions regarding 
gender differences in cognitive distortions and perceived stress; this is an area that 
requires further investigation (Sowa & Lustman, 1984; Oliver & Baumgart, 1985; Bruno, 
2010; Leung & Wong, 1998).  Also, there is a dearth of literature regarding differences in 
cognitive distortions across age and level of education (Stehouwer et al., 1985).  To 
investigate these differences in greater detail as well as to examine the prevalence of 
cognitive distortions in the general public would be beneficial.  If clinicians had a 
measure that was sensitive enough to detect specific cognitive distortions in a community 
sample, and could better understand and predict the underlying cognitive processing that 
may lead to emotional disorders, they could develop more closely focused treatments as 
well as track changes in symptomatology.  The purpose of the current study is to 
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investigate the use of the ICD in measuring cognitive distortions in a community sample 
and whether or not the instrument correlates with a measure of perceived stress.  In order 
to obtain a community sample in an efficient and cost effective manner, data will be 
collected via the Internet.  Although the Internet is a useful means of gathering data, there 
are numerous drawbacks that must be considered. 
 Internet Data Collection. 
 With the exponential growth of Internet usage over the past decade, the Internet 
has become a popular source for data collection.  Due to its rapid growth and easy access 
to large or specific samples, an increasing number of researchers are relying on the 
Internet to study human attitudes, preferences, and behaviors (Best & Krueger, 2004).  
Using the Internet for data collection has many advantages including cost effectiveness, 
sampling possibilities, administrative flexibility, and compilation alternatives.  In regard 
to sampling possibilities, the Internet can be used to sample a wide range of participants 
through advertisements, email, and social media networks (Best & Krueger, 2004).  The 
Internet allows for administrative flexibility because the administration of instruments 
can be tailored to fit the researcher’s needs.  Also, it is more convenient for the 
participant to be able to complete the questionnaires when he or she has the opportunity 
instead of having to participate during a specified time or specific meeting place.  
Compilation alternatives pertain to the Internet providing researchers with a variety of 
options for collecting responses (Best & Krueger, 2004).  Participants have the ability to 
complete the entire questionnaire or complete a portion and return to it at a later date.  By 
using the Internet, participants can click a hyperlink sent through email or social network 
and instantly complete the questionnaire.  This ease of responding can encourage a 
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greater number of participant responses (Best & Krueger, 2004).  Although there are 
multiple benefits to using the Internet for data collection, this method does have 
drawbacks. 
 When using the Internet for data collection, Best and Krueger (2004) list three 
prominent drawbacks.  First, the researcher may obtain a limited or biased sample due to 
poor coverage and accessibility.  Access to the Internet is not universal, so data can be 
collected only from those who own a computer and have Internet access.  Best and 
Krueger have stated that as of 2002, less than two- thirds of U.S. adults were connected 
to the Internet.  Since 2002, access and usage of the Internet have grown substantially.  
As of 2010, 75.9% of U.S. citizens older than three years of age have had access to the 
Internet in the home.  This means that over 290 million people had access to the Internet 
in 2010 (United States Census Bureau, 2010).  In regard to a varied sample, using the 
Internet may allow for a more diverse sample because of the vast number of users; this 
expansion is superior to using only college students, another common sample of 
convenience.  A second drawback is technological variation.  Due to the variation in 
technology capable of accessing and operating Internet services, researchers may find it 
difficult to ensure that all participants receive the same usable measures.  Differences in 
Internet speed may cause longer completion time, leading to a lack of responding from 
those participants with a poorly functioning Internet (Best & Krueger, 2004).  The third 
drawback is the possibility of invalid responding.  Because participants complete the 
questionnaire in an uncontrolled environment, they may not respond honestly or 
individuals may complete the materials more than once (Best & Krueger, 2004).  
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 Based on these drawbacks and the inability to obtain a probabilistic sample, the 
results of the current study should be generalized with caution.  The community sample 
collected from the Internet may not be representative of the general population due to the 
previously mentioned drawbacks and the use of a sample of convenience.  Although the 
results may not be able to generalize completely to the general public, Best and Krueger 
(2004) state that data drawn from an internet sample can serve to test various instruments, 
which is the purpose of the current study.  For the current study, in order to draw a large 
and diverse sample size, data will be collected from a sizeable pool of possible 
participants from the social media network site, Facebook. 
 Collecting Data from Facebook. 
 Recently, research has shifted from focusing on those functions that social 
networking sites have for those who use them, to utilizing the sites as a tool for research.  
Facebook is currently the largest social networking site in the world, and as of April 2012 
the site had over 900 million active users across the world (Goldman, 2012).  By using 
the social networking site as a population from which to draw a sample, researchers can 
reach millions of participants quickly, cheaply, and with minimal support (Bhutta, 2012; 
Gjoka, Kurant, Butts, & Markopoulou, 2010).  Facebook is a useful tool with to gather 
data due to its size, easy to use features, intensive use by its followers, and its continued 
growth.  In 2010, it was reported that more than half of Facebook users returned to the 
site daily (Gjoka et al., 2010).  Because of its steady use by a significant portion of the 
population, it is possible to obtain a demographically diverse sample.   
Another important feature of Facebook is the ability to find or create groups, 
which allows researchers to find specific groups of individuals to participate in their 
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studies.  Bhutta (2012) used Facebook to contact what was defined as an elusive 
subpopulation of Catholic females.  Social networking sites now make simple what was 
once a difficult task, i.e., to seek out specific groups..  Bhutta was able to collect data 
from over 2,500 baptized Catholic females in fewer than five days and reached the goal 
of 4,000 participants in less than a month, using few financial resources.  Although 
Facebook is able to reach out to millions of possible participants, there are still a number 
of disadvantages for using the site. 
 Similar to any of the other disadvantages when using the Internet to collect data, 
researchers cannot reach those individuals who lack computer skills, who do not have the 
Internet, or who do not have a Facebook account (Best & Krueger, 2004).  Although this 
factor appears to be a major restriction to gathering a representative sample, as stated 
previously, Internet use has drastically increased over the past decade and there is a large 
and diverse group of people using Facebook (United States Census Bureau, 2010; 
Goldman, 2012).  The site is open to the public, allowing its users to vary in age, gender, 
ethnicity, level of education and socioeconomic status.  As with most Internet data 
collection, social networking sites also do not prevent participants from taking the 
questionnaires multiple times; in addition, the readability of questionnaires can vary 
across hardware and software (Best & Krueger, 2004).  These are two drawbacks that 
must be considered as limitations when gathering data from the Internet. 
 In summary, although certain problems arise when using Facebook as a means of 
gathering data, for the purposes of the current study of examining the properties of the 
ICD using a large community sample, it should prove to be effective.  Previous research 
examining measures of cognitive distortion and stress often utilized college students and 
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teachers, which would not necessarily be representative of the population because all of 
the participants were at the college level (Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Briere, 2000; 
Weissman, 1979; Cohen et al., 1983).  By using Facebook, researchers are technically 
gathering a non-probabilistic sample, but are still capable of accessing adults from 
different levels of education, age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.  A commonly used 
sampling technique when using Facebook is the snowball or response-driven method.  
Although snowball sampling is a good method of collecting large numbers of 
participants, this method is considered a sample of convenience and non-representative of 
the population. 
 Benefits and Limitations of Snowball Sampling. 
 Snowball sampling is a form of convenience sampling or non-probability 
sampling.  Much of the existing literature in psychology uses non-probability sampling 
techniques to obtain participants either for surveys or for experiments (Cozby, 2007).  
The advantage to convenience sampling is that researchers can obtain participants and 
data without spending a great deal of money or time on selecting the sample.  For 
example, it is common knowledge that researchers collect data from students in 
introductory psychology courses because these students are required to participate 
(Cozby, 2007).  An important reason why convenience samples are sufficient in some 
cases can be stated from the following: “when the research is being conducted to study 
relationships between variables” (Crozby, 2007, p. 145).  It is also important to note that 
some non-probability samples are more representative than others; one such is drawing a 
sample from a large population.  Snowball sampling involves recruiting an initial group 
of participants, then having that group pass along information regarding the study to 
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others in order to gather more participants.  Snowball sampling using social networking 
sites occurs when electronic versions of the questionnaires are posted to a group on a 
website and then the members of that group pass the electronic questionnaires onto others 
(Browne, 2005).  Thus, snowball sampling uses interpersonal relations and connections 
between people to gather data. 
 Browne (2005) discusses the benefits and limitations of snowball sampling.  As 
stated previously, the benefits of snowball sampling include cost effectiveness, ease of 
data collection, and ability to gather large groups of participants in a short time period.  
Snowball sampling has its limitations because it can be viewed as biased; it is not random 
and participants are selected, based on social networks (Browne, 2005).  Because 
participants are selected on the basis of social networks, certain types of people may be 
excluded.  With the exclusion of various types of people, the characteristics of 
participants may not vary nor be representative of the general population (Browne, 2005).  
Although this is true, convenience sampling is sufficient when researchers are 
investigating a relationship between two variables, such as cognitive distortions and 
stress, or examining the factor structure of a new instrument (Cozby, 2007).  
 Salganik and Heckathorn (2004) discuss how to use snowball sampling to gather 
data that are as unbiased as possible.  Their methodology is capable of being adapted to 
using online social networking sites.  One method would be to list all of the friends on a 
given person’s friend list and pick every other friend as a possible participant.  A second 
method would be to find a popular group on the social networking site and again pick 
every other person from that list.  In both methods each person within the group or list of 
friends has an equal probability of being selected.  This means the snowball method 
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begins with an unbiased selection of the “seeds” or initial participants (Salganik & 
Heckathorn, 2004).  A third method is to begin a group by describing the topic of the 
study and then send invites to all friends.  Encourage the friends to gather more people to 
join until the group has a substantial number of followers.  Finally, use probability 
sampling with this group of friends and send only every other person on the list the 
questionnaires.  These were three methods of snowball sampling that may reduce bias; 
they are adapted from methodology described by Salganik and Heckathorn (2004). 
 Summary. 
 In summary, based on Beck’s (1967; 1976) cognitive theory, cognitive distortions 
play an important role in the progression and maintenance of emotional disorders.  By 
identifying cognitive distortions through the use of a brief measure, clinicians can focus 
treatment on altering the distortion, therefore changing the maladaptive schema and 
alleviating symptoms.  The purpose of the current study is to (1) further validate the 
psychometric properties and factor structure of the ICD using a community sample; 2) to 
investigate how cognitive distortions in a community sample vary as a function of certain 
demographic characteristics such as gender, age, and level of education, and 3) to 
investigate whether or not level of distorted thinking can predict level of perceived stress, 
both of which can be antecedents to emotional disorders (Hammen, 1978; Deal & 
Williams, 1998).  The responses to the ICD will be compared with an already established 
measure of dysfunctional attitude, the DAS, in order to examine the instrument’s 
convergent validity.  The ICD will also be compared with a measure of perceived stress, 
the PSS, to determine if distorting thinking can predict level of stress.  The method of 
gathering data will be snowball sampling, using the social networking site Facebook.  
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The large number of members and the diversity of users should allow for a cost efficient 
method of gathering a sizeable sample.   
Definition of Terms 
Arbitrary Inference / Jumping to Conclusions: involves unwarranted connections 
between ideas that are unrelated or drawing a negative conclusion in the absence of 
evidence to support said conclusion (Persons, 1989, Beck et al., 1979). 
Absolutistic or Dichotomous Thinking / Black-or-White Thinking: refers to 
viewing all experiences as falling into one of two categories (e.g. positive or negative), so 
if an individual’s performance falls short, he or she views the self as a total failure (Beck 
et al., 1979; Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999; Persons, 1989). 
Catastrophizing: is the process of evaluating, whereby one believes the worst 
possible outcome will or did occur (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
Comparison: refers to an individual’s tendency to compare him or herself to 
others in an inferior manner resulting in the conclusion that he or she is worse off than 
others (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1992). 
Discounting the Positive: refers to situations in which an individual rejects 
positive experiences by insisting that these do not have meaning, for some reason or other 
(Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
Emotional Reasoning: refers to assuming that negative emotions reflect the way 
things really are (e.g. someone feels something, therefore it must be true) (Burns, 1980, 
1989, 1999). 
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Externalization of Self  Worth: refers to an individual’s developing and 
maintaining self-worth based on how the external world views him or herself (Freeman & 
DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1992). 
Fortuneteller Error: is a situation in which someone anticipates a negative 
outcome and this anticipation convinces him or her that the prediction is an already-
established fact (Burns, 1980). 
Labeling: involves attaching a negative or derogatory name to oneself instead of 
describing his or her error (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
Magnification: is referred to as the “binocular effect” by Burns (1980, 1989, 
1999), because magnification is the situation in which an individual exaggerates the 
importance or consequence of some positive or negative thing, such as personal traits, 
events, or situations. 
Mind Reading: refers to an individual’s arbitrarily concluding that someone is 
reacting negatively to him or her without any evidence (Burns, 1980). 
Minimization: is a situation in which an individual discounts or shrinks the 
importance of things until they seem insignificant (Beck et al., 1979). 
Mislabeling: involves the description of an event with words that are inaccurate 
and have a strong emotional weight (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
Overgeneralization: refers to the process of formulating rules or assumptions 
based on a single negative event and applying these rules across unrelated situations 
forming a never-ending pattern of defeat (Beck et al., 1979; Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
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Perfectionism: is the situation in which someone constantly strives to live up to 
some internal or external standard of perfection without scrutinizing the reasonableness 
of such standards (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1992). 
Personalization: occurs when an individual interprets a negative event or situation 
as being caused by him or herself, that he or she was responsible for a negative 
occurrence when there is no evidence supporting that conclusion (Beck et al., 1979; 
Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999; Persons, 1989). 
Selective Abstraction / Mental Filter: is a situation in which an individual focuses 
on one negative aspect of a situation, intensifying the importance of that negative detail, 
but ignoring possible positive aspects, thereby interpreting the entire situation in a 
negative context (Persons, 1989, Beck et al., 1979).  Mental filter is similar to selective 
abstraction because it refers to identifying a single negative detail and dwelling on it 
exclusively so that one’s view of all reality becomes darkened (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
Should Statements: refers to an individual’s internal expectations or demands on 
him or herself, without contemplating the reasonableness of these expectations, 
dependent on his or her abilities, and often leading to feelings of guilt, anger, and 
frustration (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999). 
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Chapter 2 
Research Questions 
 Although the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD) has been validated using 
clinical samples, does the validation of the psychometric properties of the instrument 
persist in a community sample? 
 Do cognitive distortions in a community sample vary as a function of 
demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, and level of education? 
 Does the ICD correlate with the DAS in a community sample, further validating 
the convergent validity of the ICD? 
 Does overall level of distorted thinking predict level of perceived stress? 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1. 
H1: The psychometric properties of the ICD will be validated in a community 
sample as evidenced by high construct validity, determined by factor analysis, strong 
convergent validity, demonstrated by a .70 correlation with the DAS, and an acceptable 
level of internal consistency reliability (alpha > .80). 
Rationale for H1: Following the initial development of the ICD, Yurica (2002) 
found acceptable content validity as established by cognitive therapy experts.  The 
principal investigation of the ICD used a sample of 188 patients from two outpatient 
clinics, with 66 participants composing a control group (Yurica, 2002).  The total scale 
coefficient alpha demonstrated high internal consistency reliability (.98) and test-retest 
reliability following a five-week interval and it was also found to have a high reliability 
coefficient (.998).  In regard to convergent validity, the ICD correlated significantly with 
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the DAS (r = .70), the BDI (r = .70), and the BAI (r = .59).  These results suggested the 
higher the endorsement of cognitive distortions, the higher the frequency of dysfunctional 
thinking and the greater the endorsement of depressive and anxiety symptoms (Yurica, 
2002).  Also, the ICD was able to distinguish between depressed and non-depressed 
individuals. 
Hypothesis 2.  
H2: Exploring possible relationship differences of overall scores of cognitive 
distortion as measured by the ICD within three demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
level of education).  
Rationale for H2: The literature regarding cognitive distortions that vary by 
certain demographic characteristics is lacking. Throughout the research involving the 
study of cognitive distortions, variability in distorted thinking across different participant 
characteristics is briefly mentioned. In regard to differences within age groups and levels 
of education, the research is almost nonexistent. When comparing gender differences in 
cognitive distortions, results are variable. Sowa and Lustman (1984) used the ATQ and 
found that men exhibited greater distortions in cognitive content than women.  However, 
Oliver and Baumgart (1985) used the DAS to investigate gender differences in 
dysfunctional attitudes and their results suggest there were no significant differences 
between genders.  Although the two studies present conflicting results, different cognitive 
distortion measures were used, which may have caused the variation in the findings.  The 
current hypothesis is exploratory in order to investigate how cognitive distortions may 
vary across demographic characteristics in a community sample. 
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Hypothesis 3. 
H5: The overall level of cognitive distortion as measured by the ICD will predict 
the overall level of perceived stress as measured by the PSS. 
Rationale for H3: According to the diathesis-stress model, individuals’ cognitive 
distortions will influence only their information processing of external stimuli when in 
the presence of some perceived stressor (Beck, 1967).  When an individual is 
experiencing stress, underlying cognitive distortions may become more salient and 
exacerbate feelings of stress.  Researchers have found that cognitive distortions 
influenced the perceived stressfulness of life events in a sample of adolescents.  Those 
adolescents with higher levels of cognitive distortion tended to perceive life events as 
more stressful (Deal & Williams, 1998).  There is a cyclical nature to the relationship 
between stress and cognitive distortions.  Stressful situations can trigger cognitive 
distortions, but while processing information through distorted thinking, one can continue 
to perceive events as stressful.  Although Beck’s model states that a stressful event must 
take place prior to the onset of cognitive distortions, the current study will investigate 
whether or not cognitive distortions can predict level of perceived stress. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 Recruitment of Participants. 
 In order to collect a sizeable sample that may be representative of the larger 
community in a cost effective and timely manner, participants were recruited on the 
Internet from the social networking site, Facebook.  Facebook currently has over 900 
million users worldwide and more than half of the users return to the site daily (Goldman, 
2012; Gjoka et al., 2010).  Best and Krueger (2004) state that data drawn from an Internet 
sample can serve to test various instruments, which is the purpose of the current study. 
The first method of participant selection involved randomly selecting 100 
participants from a list of over 500 individuals using the social media site. The original 
100 participants, which are the “seeds” of the snowball sample, were selected using a 
random digits table. Each individual from the list of 500 was assigned a number and then 
using the random digits table, the 100 participants were selected. Those selected were 
then sent the link to the questionnaires and asked to pass along the link to other interested 
friends, utilizing a snowball sampling method. Although the sample was not a probability 
sample, participants were selected from a large database, creating a sample that was more 
representative than using a sample of college students. Also, convenience sampling can 
be sufficient if researchers are investigating a relationship between two variables, such as 
cognitive distortions and stress, or examining the factor structure of a new instrument 
(Cozby, 2007).   
The second method of gathering volunteers involved posting the survey link to an 
online list-serve at the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine (PCOM). Once 
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posted under the “PCOM Groups” list-serve, all students were sent an email regarding 
participation. These individuals were also requested to forward the survey link on to other 
interested individuals. By using these methods of participant selection, the convenience 
sample generated a large number of respondents using a cost effective method. IP 
addresses were not recorded in order to keep all responses anonymous, thus not allowing 
researchers to connect individual participant responses to the participant. 
 Inclusion Criteria. 
 Participants were required to meet the following conditions to participate in the 
study.  Individuals were required to be within the age range of 18 – 85 and have at least 
an eighth grade education.  All participants had to speak English fluently and reside in the 
United States.   
 Exclusion Criteria. 
 Those participants who were younger than 18 years of age or older than 85 years 
of age were excluded from the study.  Individuals residing outside of the United States or 
who could not speak English fluently were excluded.  Lastly, participants were excluded 
if they did not have at least an eighth grade education.  Prior to completing the surveys, 
each participant completed five eligibility questions.  If they answered “No” to any of the 
five questions, they were not eligible to complete the surveys and the survey was 
immediately discontinued.  Only 17 individuals did not meet criteria and their data were 
omitted from the final analysis.   
Design. 
 A correlational design was employed to (1) assess the psychometric properties of 
the ICD by comparing total scores on this instrument with total scores on the DAS; (2) to 
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investigate the relationship between cognitive distortions, as measured by the ICD, and 
level of perceived stress, as measured by the PSS, and (3) to examine the relationship 
between cognitive distortions and certain demographic characteristics (gender, age, and 
level of education).  In regard to specific analyses, a factor analysis with varimax rotation 
will be used to identify the factor structure of ICD.  When examining the relationship 
between cognitive distortions and demographic characteristics independent sample t-tests 
and ANOVAs will be used.  Last, to better understand the ICD’s ability to predict levels 
of perceived stress, a regression analysis will be used, along with a correlation matrix to 
test for multicolinearity.   
 Materials. 
 Test materials consisted of the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001), the DAS-A 
(Weissman, 1979), the PSS (Cohen et al., 1983), and a demographic questionnaire to 
gather background information, administered in that order. 
 Procedure. 
 The study included participants who had access to the Internet.  Participants were 
contacted through a college list-serve or an online social networking site, which directed 
them to complete the previously listed questionnaires on Survey Monkey, a website used 
to collect survey data.  When accessing the questionnaires, the participants were initially 
informed about the study’s purpose and procedures.  All participants had the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without explanation.  Participation in the study was 
completely anonymous because the researcher was unable to connect individual 
responses to specific participants.  After agreeing to participate in the study, respondents 
initially completed the eligibility questionnaire. After participants were deemed eligible 
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to participate, they proceeded to complete the three measures (ICD; DAS-A; PSS) as well 
as the demographic questionnaire, which supplied descriptive data including age, gender, 
ethnicity, level of education, and brief psychiatric history. 
 Measures. 
 Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD). 
 Based on the cognitive model of anxiety and depression, Yurica and DiTomasso 
(2011) initially generated 120 self-report statements drawn from research, from related 
literature, and clinical experience to represent 17 types of cognitive distortions (Yurica, 
2002).  Based on the clinical literature at the time of the instrument’s development, the 
items were designed to represent the totality of cognitive distortions.  Three clinical 
experts in the field of cognitive behavioral therapy evaluated the original 120 statements.  
In order for the items to be selected for the inventory, 100% independent agreement from 
the experts was required.  The purpose of this expert rating process was to ensure that the 
items described the 17 specific distortion constructs and that the withheld items had 
sufficient content validity.  Through random selection, approximately four items per type 
of distortion were included in the final inventory.  The cognitive distortion known as 
overgeneralization was omitted from the final inventory due to lack of item consensus by 
expert raters.  In the end, 69 items were retained to compose the original ICD form used 
in the validation study.  The inventory’s factor structure measured 11 cognitive 
distortions following the validation study, which involved 188 participants completing 
the ICD (122 participants were mental health patients with a range of psychological 
disorders in outpatient treatment; 66 participants made up a control group) (Yurica, 2002; 
Yruica & DiTomasso, 2011).      
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  67 
The present version of the ICD is a 69-item self-report inventory composed of 
short sentences reflecting 11 different types of cognitive distortions.  The ICD was 
designed and validated for use with an adult clinical population with symptoms of an 
emotional disorder (DiTomasso & Yurica, 2011).  Items are scored on a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 = “Never” to 5 = “Always”.  Scores on the ICD can range from 69 
to 345, with higher scores suggesting greater frequency of cognitive distortions than 
lower scores.  The purpose of the ICD is to present a total score of cognitive distortion as 
well as scores for each subscale or specific distortion. DiTomasso & Yurica’s (2011) 
initial validation study found a high test-retest reliability coefficient for total scores (.998) 
following a five-week interval.  The instrument also demonstrated high internal 
consistency reliability with a total scale Cronbach’s alpha equaling .98, as well as alphas 
for the 11 subscales ranging from .56 to .94.  In regard to concurrent validity, total scores 
on the ICD correlated significantly and positively with other widely accepted measures of 
distorted thinking and psychopathology, such as dysfunctional attitudes, the DAS-A (r = 
.70), depression, the BDI-II (r = .70), and anxiety, the BAI (r = .59).  Yurica (2002) also 
found good construct validity.  Total scores on the ICD were able to differentiate clinical 
participants from nonclinical participants (p < .0001). 
 Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS). 
 The DAS is currently available in two forms (A and B), both of which consist of 
40-items and are designed to measure dysfunctional attitudes in depressive patients 
(Weissman, 1979).  The DAS consists of single-sentence items answered on a seven-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = “Totally Agree” and 7 = “Totally Disagree”.  The 
DAS provides a single-scaled score ranging from 40 to 280, with lower scores indicating 
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more adaptive attitudes and higher scores representing more dysfunctional attitudes.  
Weissman (1979) designed the DAS by utilizing items on Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory 
of depression.  The items were constructed to represent seven major value systems, 
including: approval, love, achievement, perfectionism, entitlement, omnipotence, and 
autonomy.  Weissman (1979) originally validated the measure using 355 undergraduate 
and graduate students.  Form A of the DAS was found to have high internal consistency 
reliability, with alphas ranging from .84 to .92.  The DAS also demonstrated significant 
test-retest correlations, .80 to .84, over an 8-week period, suggesting excellent stability.  
In regard to concurrent validity, the DAS was found to correlate significantly with the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).  The DAS also had good construct validity as 
demonstrated by its ability to distinguish between depressed and non-depressed groups 
diagnosed by scores on the BDI.  Oliver and Baumgart (1985) also found results in 
support of the DAS in a sample of hospital employees and spouses.  High test-retest 
reliability was found following a 16-week period (.73); the DAS moderately correlated 
with the BDI (.41).   
 Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). 
 The PSS is a 14-item measure of perceived stress (Cohen et al., 1983).  The 
purpose of the PSS is to measure the degree to which individuals appraise certain 
situations in life as stressful (Cohen et al., 1983).  The instrument was designed to 
measure how unpredictable, uncontrollable, and overloading people find their lives 
(Cohen, 1978; Seligman, 1975).  It was constructed for community use, requiring 
respondents to have at least a junior high school education.  The properties of the PSS 
were originally examined with two samples of college students and a sample of 
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participants in a smoking cessation program.  Coefficient alpha reliability for the scale 
was .84 and .85 in the college samples and .86 in the smoking cessation sample, 
demonstrating good reliability (Cohen et al., 1983).  The PSS was a better predictor of 
depressive and physical symptomatology than were the scores on a stressful life events 
measure.  Scores on the PSS predicted utilization of health services, positively correlated 
with social anxiety, and positively correlated with cigarette smoking behavior (Cohen et 
al., 1983).  The scale also demonstrated good convergent validity by relating to a life-
event impact score.  
Currently the PSS was shortened to a 10-item version, which consists of self-
report questions pertaining to how often respondents have had certain feelings and 
thoughts over the past month (Cohen & Williamson, 1988).  Responses are recorded on a 
five-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 = “Never” to 4 = “Very Often”.  The PSS-10 was 
standardized using a probability sample of 2,387 respondents in the U.S.  The scale 
showed strong concurrent validity following significant correlations with self-reported 
health and health services measures, health behavior measures, smoking status, health 
seeking behavior, and stress measures.  Higher PSS-10 scores were also associated with 
greater vulnerability to depressive symptoms based on perceived stress, more frequent 
colds, and the inability to quit smoking (Cohen & Williamson, 1988). 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Participants. 
 To investigate the psychometric properties of the ICD in a nonclinical sample, a 
group of volunteer participants was collected, using online social networking sites and 
through an online list-serve from a medical college.  The initial participant “seeds” for 
the snowball sample were either Facebook users or students from the Philadelphia 
College of Osteopathic Medicine.  The snowball collection method was initiated by 
sending out the survey via a Survey Monkey Internet hyperlink to the randomly selected 
seed participants.  The survey was posted online for five and half months. After closing 
the survey, 793 individuals had opened the survey link. Of the 793 respondents, 17 
individuals did not meet inclusion criteria and 183 did not complete the surveys or 
omitted items.  The data for these 200 participants were omitted from the data analyses 
due to missing data and not meeting inclusion criterion, thus leaving 593 individuals who 
completed at least the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD).  The data from these 593 
participants were utilized for the investigation of the ICD factor structure and internal 
consistency reliability analysis.  However, 103 of these participants did not complete the 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) and 14 did not complete the Perceived Stress Scale 
(PSS).  Last, two individuals did not complete the demographic questionnaire. In order to 
make accurate conclusions regarding correlations between the ICD and the DAS and PSS 
scales, only the data from those who completed all of the surveys and the demographic 
questionnaire were utilized. Subsequently, 119 more responses were omitted for 
correlational analyses between scales, leaving 474 participants.  The data from the 474 
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participants were also utilized when investigating the second hypothesis, differences in 
ICD scores across differing demographic variables. 
 An analysis of the demographic characteristics of all those individuals who 
completed only the ICD could not be performed because those individuals did not 
complete all required study materials.  The questionnaire involving collection of 
demographic information was at the end of the procedure, so if participants withdrew 
from the study prior to finishing all study materials, demographic information was not 
collected.  Of the 474 participants who completed all surveys and demographic 
questionnaire, 108 were male (23%) and 366 were female (76%), which is approximately 
a 3:1 ratio of females to males.  In regard to age, 221 fell into the 18-29-age range (47%); 
125 fell in the age 30-40 range (26%), and 128 fell in the age 41-85 range (27%).  The 
sample yielded a variety of levels of education including 30 participants who had a high 
school education (6%); 37 who had graduated from a two-year college (8%); 163 who 
had graduated from a four-year college (34%), and 244 who had obtained a graduate 
degree (52%).  No participants endorsed having less than a high school education.  In 
regard to ethnicity, 19 participants indicated that they were African American (4%); nine 
endorsed Asian American/Pacific Islander (2%); 14 endorsed Latino-a/Hispanic (3%); 
one endorsed American Indian/Alaska Native (0.2%); 13 endorsed Bi-racial/Multi-racial 
(3%), and last, 418 indicated they were of European Origin or White (88%). As evident 
by the demographic statistics, the sample was not as diverse as researchers had hoped. 
The sample consisted predominantly of more highly educated European or White 
Americans, with little diversity in ethnicity and level of education.  
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 In regard to previous psychiatric history, 217 (45.8%) of participants had 
previously sought treatment from a therapist or counselor for a mental health issue. Two 
hundred and fifty-seven participants (54.2%) had not previously sought treatment. Of all 
474 participants, 139 (29.3%) sought treatment for depression, 110 (23.2%) for an 
anxiety disorder, 1 (0.2%) for a personality disorder, 11 (2.3) for an eating disorder, 16 
(3.4%) for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 2 (0.4%) for a phobia, 14 
(3%) for panic disorder, 7 (1.5%) for bipolar disorder, and 1 (0.2%) for schizophrenia.  
Forty-five participants (9.5%) endorsed “Other” for the type of mental health issue for 
which they sought treatment.  
Participation in the study was on a voluntary basis and all participants remained 
anonymous.  The only identifying information that was gathered was the previously 
mentioned demographic data. 
 Hypothesis One. 
 Factor Analysis of ICD 
 In order to test whether or not the ICD demonstrated construct validity and to 
further investigate the factor structure of the measures, a principal components factor 
analysis with varimax rotation was conducted.  The 69 items from the ICD were analyzed 
and 14 factors with rotated eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted.  Using the factor 
loading criterion of .40 and more for items in each factor, 12 factors were retained.  This 
factor loadings criterion accounted for 65.77% of the total variance. Table 1 presents the 
description and distribution of item’s corresponding factors, along with each item’s factor 
loading.  A Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic was found to be strong (KMO = 0.96), 
suggesting the inter-item correlations are relatively compact and thus the factor analysis 
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should yield distinct and reliable factors. Also, the Barlett’s test of sphericity was found 
to be significant (p < .001). This suggests that each item correlates significantly with 
other items and a factor analysis is appropriate for this dataset.    
In regard to individual factors, only items that loaded uniquely to one factor were 
included; therefore, items that loaded on 2 or more factors were omitted unless otherwise 
noted.  Results indicate that items, which loaded on individual factors, closely reflect 8 of 
the 11 hypothesized subscales of cognitive distortions identified following the original 
study investigating the psychometric properties of the ICD using a clinical sample 
(Yurica, 2002).  The eight factors included magnification, fortune-telling, externalization 
of self worth, perfectionism, emotional reasoning, minimization, comparison with others, 
and emotional reasoning and decision-making.  
In comparison with the original ICD investigation (Yurica, 2002), the Labeling, 
Arbitrary Inference/Jumping to Conclusions, and Mind Reading factors were not 
supported when using a community sample. However, it is of some interest that four new 
subscales were identified, which were similar to other previously identified cognitive 
distortions: Discounting the Positive and Personalization, Absolutistic or Dichotomous 
Thinking, Should Statements, and Catastrophizing (Burns, 1980, 1989, 1999; Beck et al., 
1979).  The factor structure and item loadings are listed in Table 1. 
 Factor 1, Discounting the Positive and Personalization, included 14 items.  This 
factor involved a combination of items that described two types of previously determined 
cognitive distortions.  The cognitive distortions were combined because items that loaded 
onto this factor were variable, but appeared consistently to describe features of both 
discounting positive aspects of oneself and self-blame for negative life events.  These 
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items generally reflect the degree to which individuals reject positive experiences by 
insisting that they do not have meaning.  This factor accounted for the largest single 
variance of all factors in the scale (12.59%).  In addition, items reflecting self-blame for 
negative occurrences or life situations were included in this factor.  Discounting the 
Positive and Personalization refers to one’s processing of information through a mental 
filter in which he or she downplays personal accomplishments and compliments as being 
unimportant, and at the time emphasizes his or her role in causing a negative event or 
situation, even if there is no evidence supporting this conclusion.  These individuals may 
have difficulty accepting praise or approval from their support system, as well as feeling 
they are to blame for negative life events.  Also, few items loading on this factor reflected 
negative self-comparison with others.  This suggests individuals who score high on 
Factor 1 engage in frequent upward social comparison with others, often processing 
information in such a way that they seem worse than those with whom they compare 
themselves.  
 Factor 2, Magnification, consisted of seven items and accounts for 8.54% of the 
total cumulative variance.  Burns (1980, 1989, 1999) referred to this cognitive distortion 
as the “binocular effect.”  This is a situation in which an individual exaggerates or 
magnifies the positive or negative importance or consequence of some personal trait, 
event, or situation.  Those participants who scored high on this distortion may exaggerate 
or amplify small events into more significant problems than they truly are.  At times they 
may assign greater significance to a personal trait of life event, often in a negative 
manner. 
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 Factor 3, Fortune-Telling, included five items and accounted for 7.56% of the 
overall variance.  This factor measures an individual’s tendency to anticipate some 
negative outcome and then convince him or herself that the prediction is an established 
fact or unchangeable.  Fortune-Telling is the process in which someone truly believes a 
negative event is going to take place and his or her prediction is absolute. 
 Factor 4, Externalization of Self-Worth, consisted of five items and accounted for 
7.19% of the total cumulative variance.  This cognitive distortion refers to the need for 
approval and validation from others in order to maintain one’s self-worth.  
Externalization of Self-Worth is the development and maintenance of self-worth based on 
how one’s external environment views him or herself.  This factor appears to measure an 
individual’s locus of control, specifically an external locus of control.  This suggests that 
individuals who score high on this factor tend to view their self-worth as stemming from 
the external world or feel they have little control over what happens in their lives. 
 Factor 5, Perfectionism, consisted of three items and accounted for 4.94% of the 
overall variance.  This cognitive distortion occurs when someone constantly strives to 
live up to some internal or external standard of perfection.  These individuals tend to have 
high standards for themselves in order to be perfect, without examining the 
reasonableness of such standards. 
 Factor 6, Absolutistic or Dichotomous Thinking, included four items accounting 
for 3.96% of the total cumulative variance.  This factor refers to the tendency of 
individuals to view all experiences as falling into one of two categories (e.g. positive or 
negative).  Individuals who score high on this cognitive distortion tend to see things as 
“black or white” with no grey area.  Often times if an individual’s performance falls 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS  76 
short, he or she views the self as a total failure, instead of identifying the good features 
about the performance. 
 Factor 7, Emotional Reasoning, consisted of three items and accounted for 3.55% 
of the total cumulative variance.  Individuals who score high on this factor tend to assume 
their emotions reflect the way things really are. In other words, if someone feels 
something, it must be true, allowing his or her emotional states to generate conclusions 
about himself or herself, others, or life events. 
 Factor 8, Minimization, included three items accounting for 3.15% of the overall 
variance.  Minimization refers to times when an individual discounts or diminishes the 
importance of things until they appear insignificant.  Individuals who score high on this 
cognitive distortion tend to minimize the importance of some personal trait or life event. 
 Factor 9, Comparison With Others, included two items and accounted for 2.86% 
of the overall variance.  Comparison With Others is the tendency to compare oneself with 
others as an inferior, resulting in a feeling of being worse or less than others in a 
meaningful way.  Individuals who score high on this factor tend to compare themselves 
with others and often reach negative conclusions about themselves. 
 Factor 10, Should Statements, consisted of three items, accounting for 2.79% of 
the total cumulative variance.  Should Statements refer to the internal demands or 
expectations that someone has for him or herself.  Those who score high on this factor 
tend to place immense pressure on themselves in determining how they “should” have 
performed, without contemplating the reasonableness of these expectations, dependent on 
their abilities.  This cognitive distortion often leads to feelings of regret, guilt, anger, and 
frustration. 
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 Factor 11, Catastophizing, consisted of two items and accounted for 2.41% of the 
overall variance.  This factor is made up of two questions that could possibly be placed 
within other cognitive distortion subscales, but when combined, can be interpreted as the 
Catastrophizing distortion.  This factor refers to the process of evaluating a past or 
present situation, in which one believes the worst possible outcome did or will occur.  
Individuals who score high on this distortion tend to interpret current or past situations as 
catastrophic, believing that these situations could not have been worse. 
 Factor 12, Emotional Reasoning and Decision Making, included two items 
accounting for 2.29% of the total cumulative variance.  Following the initial investigation 
of the measure, this was an unexpected, new factor.  The current results confirm this 
subscale as accurately describing the items that loaded on this factor.  Individuals who 
score high on this distortion tend to rely on their emotions to make decisions.  This 
appears to relate to what most people define as “relying on their gut feeling”.  Emotional 
reasoning is a situation in which one uses emotional states to validate experiences in the 
world. 
 Table 2 lists variance data for the individual ICD factors using rotation sums of 
squared loadings.  The percentages of variance, as well as the cumulative percentage 
variance, are presented for each factor. 
 Correlation of ICD Factors 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for each relationship between 
factors.  Table 3 presents the intercorrelations for each ICD factor.  Pearson correlation 
coefficients for a majority of the factors were significantly and positively correlated (p < 
.01).  The correlation coefficients of those factors that were significantly correlated 
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ranged from .113 to .696, suggesting strong relationships between most factors.  
However, the relationships are not strong enough to suggest multicolinearity, meaning 
each factor can be considered to measure its own individual construct. 
The relationship between Factor 5 and Factor 9 was significant at the .05 level.  
However, some correlations were found to be insignificant.  The relationship between 
Factor 5 and Factor 8 was not significant, r(591) = -.039, p = .34, as was the relationship 
be Factor 5 and Factor 12, r(591) = 0.57, p = .17.  Last, no relationship was found 
between Factor 7 and Factor 9, r(591) = .025, p = .55.  This suggests those individuals’ 
endorsements of items pertaining to the perfectionism cognitive distortion is not related 
to the cognitive distortions of minimization and emotional reasoning and decision-
making.  Also, those individuals who scored high on the emotional reasoning distortion 
did not tend to score high on the comparison to others factor.  
 ICD Coefficient Alpha Reliability 
 To investigate the internal consistency reliability of the ICD, a total scale estimate 
of internal reliability was calculated using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha.  Also, subscale 
estimates of internal consistency were also calculated for each factor.  Coefficient alpha 
data for the total scale and each factor are listed in Table 4.  The total scale Cronbach’s 
alpha was suggestive of strong internal consistency reliability (α = .97).  This finding 
confirmed the current predicted hypothesis and was consistent with Yurica’s (2002) 
original findings (α = .98). 
ICD Content Validity Analyses 
To examine whether or not the ICD correlated with a previously established 
measure of cognitive distortions as well as a measure of perceived stress, analyses using 
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the Pearson Coefficients of Correlation were conducted.  Total score for the ICD, the 
DAS, and the PSS were calculated and correlations were then computed.  Results are 
presented in Table 5. 
 ICD and DAS:  Total scores on the ICD and the DAS were found to be 
significantly and positively correlated, r (472) = .75, p < .001.  The results indicate the 
lower the total ICD score (e.g. lower overall frequency of cognitive distortions), the 
lower the endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes.  Conversely, as participants’ 
endorsements of cognitive distortions increased, so did their endorsements of frequency 
of dysfunctional attitudes.  These results suggest strong convergent validity as 
demonstrated by a .75 correlation between the ICD and DAS (Figure 1).  
 ICD and PSS:  Total scores on the ICD and the PSS were found to be significantly 
and positively correlated, r (472) = .63, p < .001.  The results indicate that the greater the 
frequency of cognitive distortions, the greater the endorsement of perceived stress.  
Conversely, as participants’ endorsements of cognitive distortions decreased, so did their 
endorsements of intensity of perceived stress from environmental factors. 
Hypothesis Two. 
Difference in Cognitive Distortions Across Demographics as Measured by the 
ICD 
 Gender:  To examine whether or not male and female participants differed on 
total levels of cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD, an independent samples t-
test was computed.  Due to an insignificant Levene’s test, equal variances between 
groups were assumed (p = .68).  A statistically significant difference was found between 
male and female overall level of endorsement of cognitive distortions, t (472) = -2.75, p = 
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.006. However, the effect size for this relationship was in the small to moderate range 
(Cohen’s d = -0.30).  This suggests that although a significant difference exists between 
males and females overall endorsements of cognitive distortions, the magnitude of the 
effect is relatively small.  On average, females (M = 176.18, SD = 33.12) endorsed a 
statistically greater level of distorted thinking than males (M = 166.26, SD = 32.31).  In 
this sample, females had a tendency for a significantly greater use and frequency of 
cognitive distortions in comparison with males.  Means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 6. 
 Age: To investigate whether or not overall level of cognitive distortions varied 
depending on a participant’s age, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
computed.  Due to an insignificant Levene’s test, equal variances between groups were 
assumed (p = .84).  An overall significant difference was found for participants’ total 
level of cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD, depending on participants’ age, F 
(2, 471) = 8.50, p < .001.  The overall effect size for this relationship between age and 
level of cognition distortions was large (η2 = 0.35).  A Tukey post hoc analysis revealed 
significant differences between those participants in the 18-29 age range and those in the 
41-85 age range (p < .001).  However, the effect size for this relationship was moderate 
(Cohen’s d = 0.46).  This suggests the magnitude of the difference in overall level of 
cognitive distortions between individuals who are 18-29 years old and 41-84 years old is 
moderate.  There were no other significant differences noted between the remaining age 
ranges.  Those participants in the 18-29 age range (M = 179.82, SD = 32.99) endorsed a 
significantly greater use and frequency of cognitive distortions than participants in the 
41-85 age range (M = 164.98, SD = 31.86).  Those individuals in the 30-40 age range (M 
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= 172.65, SD = 32.82) did not significantly differ in level of cognitive distortions from 
either of the other age ranges.  In this sample, the level of use and frequency of cognitive 
distortions seemed to decrease over the lifespan as individuals grow older.  Means and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 7. 
 Level of Education: To investigate whether or not overall level of cognitive 
distortions varied depending on a participant’s level of education, a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was computed.   Due to an insignificant Levene’s test, equal 
variances between groups were assumed (p = .60).  No significant differences were found 
for participants’ total level of cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD depending on 
participants’ level of education, F (3, 270) = 0.51, p = .68.  Also, as would be expected, 
the overall effect size of this relationship was small (η2 = 0.003).  No significant 
differences in overall use and frequency of cognitive distortions were noted between 
those participants with a high school education (M = 174.10, SD = 30.71), a two-year 
college degree (M = 179.89, SD = 39.33), a four-year college degree (M = 174.31, SD = 
33.08), or a graduate degree (M = 172.74, SD = 32.58).  Means and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 8.         
 Hypothesis Three. 
 ICD Predicting Scores on PSS 
To investigate if total scores on the ICD can predict participants’ endorsements of 
level of perceived stress from environmental and situational factors, a simple regression 
was computed.  Prior to the regression analysis, a correlation analyses was computed 
between overall scores on the PSS and overall scores on the ICD in order to test for 
multicolinearity.  The results of the correlation were significant, r (472) = .63, p < .001, 
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but not significant enough to suggest multicolinearity.  The results were found to be 
statistically significant, F (1, 472) = 315.30, p < .001, suggesting that overall level of 
cognitive distortions can predict participants’ overall levels of perceived stress.  The 
identified equation to understand this relationship was PSS Total Score = (-6.19) + 
0.133*(ICD Total Score).  The adjusted R squared value was .399, which suggests that 
participants’ levels of endorsement of cognitive distortions can explain approximately 
40% of the variance in levels of perceived stress.  Participants’ perceptions of stress from 
the environment can be predicted by their frequency and use of cognitive distortions or 
distorted thinking.  Results are presented in Figure 2 and Table 9. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
Cognitive theory suggests that cognitive distortion is one commonality among the 
etiology and pathology of emotional disorders (Beck, 1967).  Cognitive distortion occurs 
when individuals process or interpret external information or situations based on 
maladaptive rules, assumptions, or schema (Beck, 1967; 1976; Young et al., 2003; 
Kendall, 1992).  The ICD was developed in response to a need for better 
conceptualization of cognitive distortion within a clinical population suffering from 
emotional disorders.  Presently, other measures of cognitive distortion tend to lack 
specificity of the terms used to describe cognitive distortions; they also result in variable 
measurement across instruments, are outdated, and have limited applicability and scope 
(Yurica, 2002; DiTomasso & Yurica, 2011).  The utility of the ICD was originally 
examined using only clinical populations (Yurica, 2002; Rosenfield 2004; Uhl, 2007).  
The current study seeks to examine the standardization and properties of the ICD using a 
nonclinical, community sample, similar to the development of previous measures of 
cognitive distortion.  The purpose of the study was threefold: 1) to further validate the 
psychometric properties and factor structure of the ICD using a community sample; 2) to 
investigate how cognitive distortions in a community sample vary as a function of certain 
demographic characteristics such as gender, age, and level of education, and; 3) to 
investigate whether or not level of distorted thinking can predict level of perceived stress, 
both of which can be antecedents to emotional disorders (Hammen, 1978; Deal & 
Williams, 1998). 
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Psychometric Properties. 
A factor analysis of the ICD revealed statistically significant results for the 
internal structure of the scale.  To investigate the individual subscales of the ICD, a 
principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was computed.  A total of 14 
factors with eigenvalues greater than one were found.  Using a loading criterion of .40 or 
more, 12 factors were retained.  The current results were slightly inconsistent with 
previous findings.  The original study found 11 factors, instead of 12, when using a 
clinical sample (Yurica, 2002).  The current study used a loading cut-off of .40 instead of 
.45, as was used in the original study, due to the use of a nonclinical sample who, in 
theory, would not endorse a level of cognitive distortions as high as that of a clinical 
sample.  Of the original 69 items, 51 loaded uniquely onto the 12 factors and accounted 
for 65.77% of the total cumulative variance.  This is similar to the 2002 study, which 
found 57 items loading on 11 factors, accounting for 66.24% of the total variance 
(Yurica, 2002).  
Of the 12 factors, eight reflect similar subscales identified in the original study 
(Magnification, Fortune-Telling, Externalization of Self-Worth, Perfectionism, Emotional 
Reasoning, Minimization, Comparison to Others, and Emotional Reasoning and 
Decision-Making).  However, after administering the ICD to a nonclinical sample in the 
current study, four of the identified factors (Discounting the Positive / Personalization, 
Absolutistic or Dichotomous Thinking, Should Statements, and Catastrophizing) were 
novel in comparison with the original factor structure following the initial investigation 
(Yurica, 2002).  The following describes each factor.    
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Factor 1, Discounting the Positive and Personalization, included 14 items, and 
accounted for the largest single variance of all factors in the scale.  This factor consisted 
of a combination of items that described two types of previously determined cognitive 
distortions.  These items generally reflect the degree to which individuals reject positive 
experiences by insisting that they do not have meaning.   In addition, items reflecting 
self-blame for negative occurrences or life situations were included in this factor.  This 
subscale refers to one’s processing of information through a mental filter in which he or 
she downplays personal accomplishments and compliments as being unimportant, and at 
the time emphasizing his or her role in causing a negative event of situation, even if there 
is no evidence supporting this conclusion.  Also, few items loading on this factor 
reflected negative self-comparison with others.  Factor 1 correlated significantly (p < 
.001) with all other subscales.  Results suggest that this cognitive distortion is the most 
prevalent type of distorted thinking amongst the general population or a nonclinical 
sample.  
 Factor 2, Magnification, consisted of seven items.  This factor refers to a situation 
in which an individual exaggerates or magnifies the positive or negative importance or 
consequence of some personal trait, event, or situation.  Those participants that scored 
high on this distortion may exaggerate or amplify small events into more significant 
problems than they truly are.  This factor accounted for the second largest variance of all 
factors in the scale.  This factor, too, correlated significantly with all other subscales. 
 Factor 3, Fortune-Telling, included five items.  This factor measures an 
individual’s tendency to anticipate some negative outcome and then convince him or 
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herself that the prediction is an established fact, unchangeable, or absolute.  Again, the 
relationship between this factor and all other factors was statistically significant. 
 Factor 4, Externalization of Self-Worth, consisted of five items and referred to the 
need for approval and validation from others in order to maintain one’s self-worth.  
Externalization of Self-Worth is the development and maintenance of self-worth based on 
how one’s external environment views him or herself.  Individuals who score high on this 
factor tend to view their self-worth as stemming from the external world or feel they have 
little control over what happens in their lives.  This factor also correlates significantly 
with all other factors. 
 Factor 5, Perfectionism, consisted of three items.  This cognitive distortion occurs 
when someone constantly strives to live up to some internal or external standard of 
perfection.  These individuals tend to have high standards for themselves in order to be 
perfect, but they do not examine the reasonableness of such standards.  It is of some 
interest that this factor did not correlate significantly with all other subscales.  The ratings 
for the Perfectionism distortion were unrelated to individual’s ratings of the Minimization 
and Emotional Reasoning and Decision-Making distortion (p = .34 and p = .17 
respectively).  A possible explanation for this may be that individuals who endorse the 
perfectionism distortion may have more significant anxiety symptoms, arising from fear 
of things not being perfect. However, those who minimize important details or 
accomplishments in their lives or use emotional reasoning and decision-making when 
examining past mistakes or failures may be more prone to depressive symptoms.  As 
stated in the literature review, those individuals coping with depression tend to have an 
interpretational framework that is absolutist or revolves around themes of loss 
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deprivation, and personal inadequacy, but those coping with anxiety tend to use cognitive 
distortions that are probabilistic in nature and consist of perceptions of possible future 
psychological or physical harm (Burns and Eidelson, 1998).     
 Factor 6, Absolutistic or Dichotomous Thinking, included four items and refers to 
the tendency of individuals to view all experiences as falling into one of two categories 
(e.g. positive or negative).  Often, if an individual’s performance falls short, he or she 
views the self as a total failure instead of identifying the good features about the 
performance.  The dichotomous thinking distortion correlated significantly with all other 
identified cognitive distortion subscales.   
 Factor 7, Emotional Reasoning, consisted of three items.  Individuals who score 
high on this factor tend to assume that their emotions reflect the way things really are. In 
other words, if someone feels something, it must be true, allowing his or her emotional 
states generate conclusions about him or herself, others, or life events.  Although this 
factor correlated significantly with a majority of the other subscales, it did not correlate 
with the Comparison to Others distortion (p = .55).  This suggests that in a nonclinical 
sample, individuals who use their current emotional states to interpret life situations do 
not also compare themselves to others in a negative manner.   
 Factor 8, Minimization, included three items and refers to a situation in which an 
individual discounts or diminishes the importance of things until they appear 
insignificant.  This factor correlated significantly with all other subscales, except for the 
factor five (Perfectionism). 
 Factor 9, Comparison to Others, included two items.  This factor describes the 
tendency to compare oneself with others, as if the self were inferior, resulting in a feeling 
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of being worse or less than others in a meaningful way.  Individuals who score high on 
this factor tend to compare themselves with others and often reach negative conclusions 
about themselves.  One item that loaded on this factor also loaded on Factor 1 
(Discounting the Positive / Personalization), which had other items that describe the 
comparison with others distortion.  Factor nine was significantly related to all other 
factors at the .05 level. 
 Factor 10, Should Statements, consisted of three items and referred to the internal 
demands or expectations someone has for him or herself.  Individuals may feel immense 
pressure about how they “should” have performed, without contemplating the 
reasonableness of these expectations, dependent on their abilities.  Often this leads to 
feelings of regret, guilt, anger, and frustration.  Again, factor ten correlates significantly 
with all other subscales. 
 Factor 11, Catastophizing, consisted of two items.  This factor is made up of two 
questions that could possibly be placed within other cognitive distortion subscales, but 
when combined, can be interpreted as the Catastrophizing distortion.  Catastrophizing is 
the process of evaluating a past or present situation, and believing that the worst possible 
outcome did or will occur.  Combined items for this factor are significantly related to all 
other subscales. 
 Factor 12, Emotional Reasoning and Decision Making, included two items.  This 
was an unexpected, new factor following the initial investigation of the measure.  The 
current results confirmed this subscale.  This factor describes the reliance on emotions to 
make decisions.  It relates to occurrences that most people define as “relying on their gut 
feelings”.  Emotional reasoning occurs when one uses emotional states to validate 
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experiences in the world.  This subscales correlates significantly with all other factors 
except for Factor 5 (Perfectionism). 
Internal consistency reliability was examined using Cronbach’s alpha to 
determine if the self-statement items reliably measure overall level of cognitive distortion 
as well as reliably measure each individual subscale.  The total scale estimate of internal 
reliability consistency was strong (α = .97).  This finding confirmed the current predicted 
hypothesis and was consistent with Yurica’s (2002) original findings (α = .98).  As for 
each individual subscale, the Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .47 to .94.  Factor 12 
(Emotional Reasoning and Decision-Making) had the smallest alpha, suggesting weaker 
internal consistency, but the internal reliability of Factor 1 (Discounting the Positive / 
Personalization) was the strongest of all factors. 
Correlational findings suggested that the ICD has good convergent validity based 
on its comparison with the DAS (r = .75).  The ICD correlated significantly and 
positively with the DAS; however the correlation is not strong enough to say that both 
measures are identical.  This suggests that the ICD and DAS are measuring a similar 
construct, but the ICD is measuring slightly different features of said construct. This 
finding suggests that the greater the endorsement of cognitive distortion as measured by 
the ICD, the greater the endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes as measured by the DAS. 
Yurica (2002) found similar results when collecting ICD data from a clinical population, 
because the correlation between the ICD and DAS following her study was similar to the 
current findings (r = .70).  The current research lends further support for the convergent 
validity of the ICD using a large community sample, because similar results were found 
in comparison with previous research using a smaller clinical sample (Yurica, 2002). 
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In regard to the diathesis-stress model of emotional disorders, the current findings 
lend support to the relationship between stress and cognitive distortions (Beck, 1967).  
Deal and Williams (1998) found that cognitive distortions influenced the perceived 
stressfulness of life events.  Those adolescents with higher levels of cognitive distortion 
tended to perceive life events as more stressful (Deal & Williams, 1998).  The researchers 
suggested that individuals with high levels of cognitive distortion tend to interpret life 
situations as more stressful and are more susceptible to depressive symptoms.  The 
current research found similar results because the PSS scale correlated significantly with 
the ICD (r = .63).  This suggests that as the frequency and intensity of cognitive 
distortions increase, so does an individual’s level of perceived stress.  Without the 
underlying cognitive distortions to mediate individuals’ experiences, life events may not 
be interpreted to be stressful and depressive symptoms may not subsequently develop. 
Demographic Characteristics. 
There is currently a dearth of literature examining the variability of cognitive 
distortion across certain demographic characteristics.  The nature of the present 
hypothesis was exploratory and investigated the differences in cognitive distortion, 
depending on gender, age range, and level of education.  In regard to differences within 
age groups and levels of education, the research is almost nonexistent.  The current 
clinical literature has varying results when comparing gender differences in cognitive 
distortions. Sowa and Lustman (1984) found that men tended to have greater distortions 
in cognitive content than do women.  However, Oliver and Baumgart (1985) investigated 
gender differences in dysfunctional attitudes and the results suggested there were no 
significant differences between genders.  The conflicting results found by the studies are 
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most likely due to the utilization of different cognitive distortion measures.  When 
validating a measure, it is crucial to understand whether or not scores on the instrument 
vary because of different demographic characteristics; this is necessary in order to be 
aware of the measures limitations. 
The current findings revealed that a significant difference in frequency and 
intensity of cognitive distortions does exist between males and females.  On average, the 
females in the present sample endorsed significantly greater levels of cognitive 
distortions than males (p = .006).  However, the ratio of females to males in the sample 
was approximately 3:1, suggesting there were far more females who completed the study.  
This may have led to less variability in responding from the males as compared with 
variability in responding from the females.  The current findings were expected because 
of the number of females who experience symptoms of depression being significantly 
greater than the number of males who experience these symptoms.  The National Institute 
of Mental Health estimates that women are 70% more likely than men to experience 
depression during their lifetimes (National Institute of Mental Health).  In 2012, among 
adults, 8.4% of females experienced symptoms of major depression, whereas only 5.2% 
of males experienced these symptoms.  In that same year, among adolescents 13.7% of 
females experienced an episode of major depression, whereas 4.7% of male adolescents 
experienced similar episodes (National Institute of Mental Health, 2012).  Based on these 
statistics, it was expected that female participants would be experiencing more symptoms 
of depression than male participants; this suggests that based on the cognitive model of 
depression, females should also be experiencing greater levels of cognitive distortions 
than males.  Even though the current study utilized a community sample, it is expected 
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that previous statistics suggesting that females experience depression at a great level than 
males will carry-over into a nonclinical sample, but at a subclinical level (National 
Institute of Mental Health, 2012).   
The current researchers could not find any research investigating rates of 
cognitive distortions that were based on age and level of education.  The current 
exploratory findings found a significant difference in levels of cognitive distortion based 
on a participant’s age (p < .001).  Those individuals who were 18 to 29 years old had 
significantly greater levels of cognitive distortions than individuals who were 41 to 85 
years old.  Interestingly, a qualitative review of the means and standard deviations of all 
three age groupings revealed a gradual decline in levels of cognitive distortions across the 
lifespan.  It appears that as human beings age, the frequency and intensity of cognitive 
distortions decrease.  A possible explanation for this trend may be due to individuals 
maturing as they age, leading to a reduction in reactivity to life events.  Previous research 
suggests possible factors for the reduction of depression symptoms across the lifespan 
include decreased emotional responsiveness with age, increased emotional control, and 
psychological immunization to stressful experiences (Jorm, 2000).   
In regard to cognitive distortions varying, based on level of education, the current 
results did not suggest any significant differences (p = .68).  There were no significant 
differences in overall use and frequency of cognitive distortions, as measured by the ICD, 
which depended on the participants’ levels of education.  All those individuals with a 
high school education, a two-year college degree, a four-year college degree, or a 
graduate degree endorsed similar levels of cognitive distortions.  This may be due to 
unequal representation of groups within the sample.  There were significantly more 
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individuals with a graduate degree than there were with any other level of education, and 
there were no participants who endorsed having less than a high school degree. 
Stress and Cognitive Distortion. 
The final hypothesis predicted that the overall level of cognitive distortion would 
predict overall level of perceived stress.  Based on the diathesis-stress model, some 
individuals have a predisposition (diathesis) or vulnerability to developing a form of 
psychopathology.  When the predisposition is combined with a perceived stressful event, 
the individual becomes even more susceptible to developing a disorder (Sigelman & 
Rider, 2009).  For example, someone with a family history of depression has a 
predisposition to develop such a disorder following a stressful event.  The current study 
suggests that a vulnerable predisposition may include early maladaptive schema that 
developed into cognitive distortions, thus causing the individual to process a stressful 
situation in a dysfunctional way, leading to an emotional disorder.  If cognitive 
distortions exacerbate the perceived stressfulness of life events, it would be useful to 
understand the relationship between cognitive distortion and stress in a clinical setting 
because both factors play a role in the etiology of psychopathology.  Studies have found a 
significant relationship between stress, cognitive distortion, and depression (Smith, 
O’Keefe, & Christensen, 1994; Lefebvre, 1981; Deal & Williams, 1998).  To 
demonstrate the utility of the ICD, it was imperative that the measure be related to a 
measure of perceived stress because the constructs are related in regard to emotional 
disorders. 
The current findings suggest that an individual’s overall level of cognitive 
distortion can predict his or her tendency to perceive life events as stressful.  Participants’ 
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endorsements of cognitive distortions were able to predict, significantly, their levels of 
perceived stress (p < .001).  The results suggested that his or her level of endorsement of 
cognitive distortions as measured by the ICD could explain approximately 40% of the 
variance in a participant’s level of perceived stress as measured by the PSS.  Although 
cognitive distortions were able to account for a significant amount of the variance of 
participants’ perceived stress, there is still variance that was unaccounted for.  Across all 
hypotheses, cognitive distortions do not account for all variance in participants’ scores 
across measures.  Research suggests although cognitive distortions play a large role in the 
development and maintenance of depression, in other mood disorders and in stress, there 
are certainly other risk factors that might account for the remaining variance.  Other 
possible factors include certain personality traits, such as temperament and low self-
esteem, serious or chronic illness, certain medications, traumatic life events, genetics or 
family history of mood disorder, and other environmental stressors (Mayo Clinic, 2014; 
Beck & Young, 1985; Beck & Clark, 1988).            
Implications of Findings 
The ICD is able to give clinicians the ability to assess and identify quickly those 
specific cognitive distortions that tend to exacerbate individuals mental illness.  Previous 
measures of cognitive distortion are incapable of identifying more than four types of 
distorted thinking.  Research has demonstrated the utility of the ICD in identifying 
cognitive distortions and has also supplied evidence of its value in the clinical setting 
(Yurica, 2002; Rosenfield, 2004: Uhl, 2007). The current study demonstrated the 
incremental validity of the ICD in comparison with the DAS in regard to applicability 
and scope.  The ICD has the capability of measuring specific cognitive distortions, which 
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will add significant value to the clinical literature regarding detailed measurement of 
distorted thinking. The implications of the current research provide further support for the 
psychometric properties of the ICD.  The study examined the factor structure, reliability, 
and validity of the ICD, using a larger sample size to provide evidence for the utility of 
the measure.  Also, by utilizing a larger, more diverse sample, the current research 
increased the ecological validity.   
The current study has attempted to understand the variability of cognitive 
distortions, if any, based on background characteristics.  Results suggested that, in this 
nonclinical population, females tended to have higher levels of cognitive distortions than 
males, and that the level of cognitive distortions decreases slightly with age.  This implies 
the idea that as individuals age, they develop a more realistic thinking process, which 
leads to a decreased rate of mood or anxiety symptoms. Also, based on the current 
findings, cognitive distortions do not tend to vary due to level of education.  The more 
clinicians understand distorted information processing and recognize those who are more 
likely to have greater levels of cognitive distortion, the more symptom-focused the 
treatments can be, and thus can become more efficient.   
Lastly, the current research generated further evidence for the relationship 
between cognitive distortion and perceived stress in a nonclinical population.  Those 
individuals who have greater levels of cognitive distortion tend to also perceive life 
events as more stressful.  This finding suggests that if treatment can efficiently identify 
and alter an individual’s specific cognitive distortions, he or she is also likely to find a 
decrease in level of perceived stress.   
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An implication for clinical psychology in general is the importance of using well-
validated and empirically supported measures in clinical practice.  The more research that 
is conducted on a specific measure serves only to increase its utility to the practicing 
clinician as well as its benefits to individuals suffering from mental illness. Also, the ICD 
could be used as a tool in therapy as a means of psychoeducation. Clinicians can use the 
ICD and its questions to discuss specific cognitive distortions with the patient. It allows 
patients to see and understand the types of distorted thinking which may be influencing or 
maintaining their mood disorders.    
Limitations 
Several limitations for the current study should be noted.  First, the method for 
collecting data resulted in a nonprobability sample.  Although the sample was thought to 
be more representative than most samples of convenience, such as using college students, 
the current results should be generalized to the larger population with caution because of 
little variation in ethnicity and level of education.  By collecting data via online social 
networking and on a graduate school campus, the sample does not quite represent the 
same diversity present in the overall population.   
Second, the sample size, although larger than most previous studies, was not as 
large as many other samples used to evaluate other self-report clinical instruments.  Most 
clinical measures were developed and standardized using much larger sample sizes, such 
as 1,000-2,000 participants.  However, the current sample size did allow for sufficient 
power to draw accurate conclusions. 
Third, the researchers did not account for those individuals currently receiving 
psychotherapy or other treatments for mental health issues.  Thus, some individuals who 
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participated in the study may fall under the category of “clinical”, suggesting the sample 
may not be entirely composed of “nonclinical” participants. 
Fourth, a factor-loading cutoff of .40 was used for the current study, in 
comparison with the original study’s cutoff of .45.  Because the current study utilized a 
nonclinical, community sample, a slightly less strict criterion was used in order to allow  
more variability in item loadings.  Future research could examine the sample population 
data using the same cutoff as in previous studies.    
 Last, the methodology of the current study did not allow individuals without 
access to the Internet to participate.  Only individuals with access to the Internet were 
able to complete the study, which again questions the diversity of the sample.  As with 
most online data collection methodology, this is a limitation that must be considered. 
 Future Studies 
 The current study used a significantly larger sample size than previous studies, 
but the current participants were selected from a community sample.  Future research 
should include continued testing of the ICD with a larger clinical population.  Also, the 
ICD has the potential to assess changes in cognitive distortions over time, but this has yet 
to be investigated.  Using a clinical sample, future studies should examine the capabilities 
of the ICD of tracking changes in cognitive distortions pre-, during, and post-treatment.  
Another interesting investigation may want to examine the variability in the levels of 
cognitive distortion based on socioeconomic status or income.  This would allow 
researchers to examine whether or not cognitive distortions decrease as one’s income 
increases. Last, studies should examine the overall utility of the ICD to the practicing 
clinician.  The use of the ICD as a clinical tool in aiding patients in the process of 
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identifying and changing particular distortions to resolve emotional disorders should be 
investigated. 
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Table 1: ICD Factor Loadings 
      
Factor 1:        Discounting the Positive / Personalization    
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 4: I tend to discount the good things about me.  0.66 
   
Item 10: What others think about me is more important  
than what I think about myself.  0.49 
   
Item 17: I have a tendency to blame myself for bad things.  0.57 
   
Item 18: Without even asking, I think other people see me in a  
negative light.  0.49 
   
Item 20: I hold myself responsible for things that are beyond my control  0.51 
   
Item 21: I tend to disqualify the positive traits I have.  0.73 
   
Item 28: I downplay my accomplishments.  0.76 
   
Item 35: Compared with other people like me, I find myself lacking.  0.53 
   
Item 50: I find myself assuming blame for things.  0.61 
   
Item 52: The positive things in my life just do not count for much at all.  0.49 
   
Item 58: I tend to downplay compliments.  0.71 
   
Item 62: When I compare myself with others, I come up short.  0.54 
   
Item 63: I put myself down.  0.70 
   
Item 65: I tend to dwell on things I do not like about myself.  0.60 
      
   
Factor 2:        Magnification   
   
Item  Loading 
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Item 8: I amplify things well beyond their importance in life.  0.65 
   
Item 24: I have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of minor things.  0.71 
   
Item 30: I have been known to make a mountain out of a molehill  0.73 
   
Item 32: I have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of even small events.  0.68 
   
Item 43: I typically make judgments without checking out all of the facts  
beforehand.  0.45 
   
Item 47: I jump to conclusions without considering alternative points of view.  0.49 
   
Item 69: I blow things out of proportion  0.72 
      
   
Factor 3:        Fortune-Telling   
   
Item  Factor 
      
   
Item 2: I feel like a fortuneteller, predicting bad things will happen to me.  0.81 
   
Item 9: I act as if I have a crystal ball, forecasting negative events in my life.  0.79 
   
Item 26: I have a habit of predicting that things will go wrong in any 
 given situation.  0.67 
   
Item 36: I believe that my negative forecasts about my future will come  
to pass.  0.66 
   
Item 55: My negative predictions usually come true.  0.58 
      
   
Factor 4:        Externalization of Self-Worth   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 1: I need others to approve of me in order to feel that I am worth  
something.  0.76 
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Item 7: I compare myself with  others all the time.  0.43 
   
Item 15: To feel good, I need others to recognize me.  0.79 
   
Item 41: I need a lot of praise from others to feel good about myself.  0.75 
   
Item 46: I find that I frequently need feedback from others to obtain a  
sense of comfort about myself.  0.74 
      
   
Factor 5:        Perfectionism   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 25: I attempt to achieve perfection in all areas of my life.  0.86 
   
Item 39: When I think about it, I am quite perfectionistic.  0.85 
   
Item 57: It is important to strive for perfection in everything I do.  0.86 
      
   
Factor 6:        Absolutistic / Dichotomous Thinking   
   
Item  Loading 
   
      
   
Item 5: I either like a person or do not; there is no in between for me.  0.73 
   
Item 22: Things seems to go all right or all wrong in my world.  0.54 
   
Item 42: In my mind, things are either black or white; there are no grey areas.  0.66 
   
Item 48: As far as my life goes, things are either great or horrible.  0.55 
      
   
Factor 7:        Emotional Reasoning   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 40: If I feel a certain way about something, I am usually right.  0.50 
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Item 56: My feelings reflect the way things are.  0.81 
   
Item 60: My feelings are an accurate reflection of the way things really are.  0.85 
      
   
Factor 8:        Minimization   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 6: I minimize the importance of even serious situations.   0.71 
   
Item 45: I find I have a tendency to minimize the consequences of my  
actions, especially if they result in negative outcomes  0.64 
   
Item 68: I underestimate the seriousness of situations.   0.68 
      
   
Factor 9:        Comparison to Others   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 19: I do few things as well as others.  0.69 
   
Item 31: Most people are better at things than I am. 
        (* This item also loaded on Factor 1)  0.62 
      
   
Factor 10:        Should Statements   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 11: Regrets in my life stem from things I should have done, but did not 
do.  0.70 
   
Item 16: I motivate myself according to how I should be.  0.41 
   
Item 27: I have a lot of shoulds, oughts, and musts in my life.  0.42 
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Factor 11:        Catastrophizing    
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 33: When a new rule comes out at work, school, or home, I think it must  
have been made because of something I did.  0.42 
   
Item 59: When something negative happens, it is just terrible.  0.41 
      
   
Factor 12:        Emotional Reasoning and Decision Making   
   
Item  Loading 
      
   
Item 12: I make decisions on the basis of my feelings.  0.74 
   
Item 66: I go with my gut feeling when deciding something.  0.71 
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Table 2: Explanation of Variance by Factor 
                
Factor  Total  
% of 
Variance  
Cumulative 
%  
                
        
1  8.68  12.59  12.59  
        
2  5.90  8.54  21.13  
        
3  5.21  7.56  28.69  
        
4  4.96  7.19  35.87  
        
5  3.41  4.94  40.81  
        
6  2.72  3.96  44.76  
        
7  2.45  3.55  48.32  
        
8  2.18  3.15  51.47  
        
9  1.97  2.86  54.32  
        
10  1.92  2.79  57.11  
        
11  1.67  2.41  59.53  
        
12  1.58  2.29  61.82  
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Table 3: Pearson Inter-Correlation Matrix of ICD Factors 
                          
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 
                          
             
 r .619 .637 .696 .238 .484 .122 .215 .573 .550 .568 .166 
F1 p</= .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r 1 .591 .590 .300 .561 .128 .239 .376 .460 .571 .324 
F2 p</=  .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 0.002 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r  1 .487 .192 .485 .199 .235 .403 .447 .533 .155 
F3 p</=   .0001 .0001 .0001 0.001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r   1 .270 .401 .138 .221 .393 .514 .501 .223 
F4 p</=    .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r    1 .300 .266 -.039 .086 .301 .234 .057 
F5 p</=     .0001 .0001 .339 .036 .0001 .0001 .167 
             
 r     1 .259 .249 .324 .333 .460 .229 
F6 p</=      .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r      1 .132 .025 .182 .174 .236 
F7 p</=       .001 .545 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r       1 .142 .195 .169 .173 
F8 p</=        .001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
             
 r        1 .389 .341 .113 
F9 p</=         .0001 .0001 .006 
             
 r         1 .438 .130 
F10 p</=          .0001 .002 
             
 r          1 .245 
F11 p</=           .0001 
             
 r           1 
F12 p</=            
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Table 4: Coefficient Alpha Reliability for Individual ICD Factors 
              
 Factor  Description  
Coefficient 
Alpha  
              
       
 1  Discounting the Positive   0.935  
   / Personalization    
       
 2  Magnification  0.880  
       
 3  Fortune-Telling  0.874  
       
 4  Externalization of Self-Worth  0.881  
       
 5  Perfectionism  0.890  
       
 6  Absolutistic / Dichotomous  0.745  
   Thinking    
       
 7  Emotional Reasoning  0.712  
       
 8  Minimization  0.581  
       
 9  Comparison to Others  0.682  
       
 10  Should Statements  0.583  
       
 11  Catastrophizing  0.540  
       
 12  Emotional Reasoning /  0.470  
   Decision Making    
       
Total ICD Scale Coefficient Alpha = .966     
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Table 5:  Correlations Between ICD, DAS, and PSS 
              
  ICDTotal  DASTotal  PSSTotal 
              
       
ICDTotal Pearson Correlation  1  0.754  0.633 
       
Sig. (1-tailed)    0.0001  0.0001 
       
N  474  474  474 
              
       
DASTotal Pearson Correlation  0.754  1  0.572 
       
Sig. (1-Tailed)  0.0001    0.0001 
       
N  474  474  474 
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Table 6:  Means and Standard Deviations for ICD Scores based on Gender (N = 474) 
              
  n  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
              
       
Males  108  166.26  32.31 
       
Females  366  176.18  33.12 
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Table 7:  Means and Standard Deviations for ICD Scores based on Age (N = 474) 
              
  n  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
              
       
18-29  221  179.82  32.99 
       
30-40  125  172.65  32.82 
       
41-85  128  164.98  31.86 
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Table 8: Means and Standard Deviations for ICD Scores based on Level of Education  
(N = 474) 
                
  n  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation  
                
        
Less than High 
School  0  X  X  
        
High School 
Graduate  30  174.10  30.71  
        
Two-Year College  37  179.89  39.33  
        
Four-Year College  163  174.31  33.08  
        
Graduate Degree  244  172.74  32.58  
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Table 9: Summary of Regression Analysis for Participant's ICD Total Score Predicting 
PSS Total Score (N = 474). 
           
                      
Variable  B  SE(B)  β  t  
Sig. 
(p) 
                      
           
ICD Total  .133  .008  .633  17.76  < .001 
                      
           
 
Constant = -6.19 
R2 = .40 
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Figure 1: Relationship Between ICD and DAS 
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Figure 2: Relationship Between ICD and PSS 
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